Inside the Surge of WordPress Supply Chain Attacks

Inside the Surge of WordPress Supply Chain Attacks ![rw-book-cover](https://img.youtube.com/vi/qWsw95hjzAc/maxresdefault.jpg) 🔗 **Source:** [Inside the Surge of WordPress Supply Chain Attacks](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWsw95hjzAc) > [!note]+ Document Notes > tags: [wordpress-security, supply-chain-attacks, ai-security, plugin-vulnerabilities] > author: [MISSING] > source: WP Minute > reference: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWsw95hjzAc > date created: {{date:YYYY-MM-DD}} {{time:HH:mm}} > > # 🏷️ Title: Inside the Surge of WordPress Supply Chain Attacks >  ## 🧭 Table of Contents - [📝 Summary](#-summary) - [📖 Main Content](#-main-content) - [🗒️ Notes](#️-notes) - [📚 References](#-references) - [🗣️ Paraphrase](#️-paraphrase) - [📰 Newsletter](#-newsletter) - [✅ Action Items](#-action-items) - [🧪 Hypotheses](#-hypotheses) - [📊 Methodology](#-methodology) - [❓ Questions](#-questions) - [🔮 Future Research](#-future-research) - [💡 Implications](#-implications) - [🧠 Learning Styles Assessment](#-learning-styles-assessment) - [📊 Accessibility Assessment](#-accessibility-assessment) - [🌍 DEIB Assessment](#-deib-assessment) - [✅ Logical Validity](#-logical-validity) - [🛡️ DARVO Analysis](#-darvo-analysis) - [🎯 Conclusion](#-conclusion) ## 📝 Summary - **What happened**: Austin Ginder discovered multiple WordPress plugin supply chain attacks where bad actors acquire legitimate plugins and inject malicious code that hijacks the update system to serve malware. - **Why it matters**: These attacks affect thousands of sites (one compromised plugin had 20,000 active installs) and traditional security tools miss them because the malicious code isn't in the official WordPress.org repository. - **Key stakeholders**: Site owners, plugin developers, WordPress security team, hosting providers, and the broader WordPress community. - **Risks and tradeoffs**: AI democratizes both vulnerability discovery and exploitation. While defenders can now find backdoors previously hidden for years, attackers can also scan for vulnerabilities at scale. - **Bottom line**: Traditional security practices are insufficient in the AI era—100% code auditing using advanced AI models is becoming necessary for adequate protection. ## 📖 Main Content Austin Ginder, owner of Anchor Hosting who manages 3,000 WordPress sites, accidentally discovered a pattern of supply chain attacks while using AI for malware cleanup. These attacks involve bad actors purchasing legitimate plugins and injecting malicious code that hijacks the WordPress update system. ### The Attack Pattern Supply chain attackers typically: 1. Acquire legitimate plugins (sometimes paying six figures, as seen with the Essential Plugin Suite case) 2. Inject hidden updater code that bypasses WordPress.org 3. Serve malicious updates directly from their own servers 4. Maintain clean versions on WordPress.org to avoid detection ### AI as Both Threat and Defense Ginder emphasizes that AI has fundamentally changed the security landscape. While traditional security advice was sufficient until late 2023, AI now enables both attackers and defenders to discover vulnerabilities at unprecedented scale. Using Claude (Anthropic's AI), Ginder can perform "forensics level" investigations that previously would have been impossible, uncovering attack chains spanning over 13 years. ### WP Beacon Development After discovering multiple supply chain attacks, Ginder developed WP Beacon (wpbeacon.io) to proactively hunt for these threats. The tool analyzes WordPress plugin repository data, looking for patterns indicating compromised plugins or bad actors operating across multiple plugins. ### Recommended Defense Strategy Ginder advocates for 100% AI-powered code auditing using the most advanced models available (he specifically recommends Claude Opus). This approach involves scanning every line of code on WordPress sites for vulnerabilities, though it requires significant computational resources. ## 🗒️ Notes #### ⏱️ [00:03:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWsw95hjzAc&t=192) AI Revolution in Security - Ginder transitioned from traditional development to AI-assisted workflows in February - AI agents like Claude enabled deep forensic analysis previously impossible - Traditional security practices became inadequate around October-November 2023 #### ⏱️ [00:08:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWsw95hjzAc&t=525) Supply Chain Attack Discovery Method - Attacks discovered accidentally during malware cleanup - AI enables tracing exact attack vectors and vulnerable code lines - Process involves expanding scope beyond immediate infection to plugin authors and patterns #### ⏱️ [00:15:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWsw95hjzAc&t=930) WP Beacon Development Process - Scanned top 2,000 WordPress plugins (covers most website installations) - Found live attack affecting 20,000 sites during initial scan - Uses crude AI analysis to identify malicious patterns in plugin repositories #### ⏱️ [00:22:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWsw95hjzAc&t=1335) Essential Plugin Suite Case Study - Bad actors purchased 30+ plugin suite for six figures on Flippa - Systematically weaponizing plugins when WordPress security team intervened - Only about 5% of sites actually got compromised due to quick response #### ⏱️ [00:28:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWsw95hjzAc&t=1680) Code Auditing Recommendations - 100% code auditing using advanced AI models (Claude Opus recommended) - Significant token usage required - estimates hundreds of thousands of lines per site - Creates unique hashes to avoid re-auditing same plugin versions #### ⏱️ [00:32:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWsw95hjzAc&t=1965) Model Quality Requirements - Only use most expensive/advanced AI models for security audits - Lower-tier models miss critical vulnerabilities - Security requires "best set of eyes" - no compromising on model quality ## 📚 References - [WP Beacon](https://wpbeacon.io) - Austin Ginder's plugin security analysis tool - [Anchor Hosting](https://anchor.host) - Ginder's hosting company and blog - [Austin Ginder on X](https://x.com/austinginder) - WordPress.org Plugin Repository Security Team - Claude AI by Anthropic - Flippa (marketplace where compromised plugins were purchased) ## 🗣️ Paraphrase Austin Ginder accidentally discovered a systematic pattern of WordPress plugin supply chain attacks while using AI for routine malware cleanup. These attacks involve bad actors purchasing legitimate plugins and secretly injecting code that hijacks the WordPress update system to serve malware. Traditional security tools miss these attacks because the malicious code doesn't appear in the official WordPress repository—instead, compromised sites receive poisoned updates directly from attacker-controlled servers. The emergence of AI has fundamentally changed cybersecurity dynamics. While defenders can now uncover vulnerabilities and attack patterns that were hidden for years, attackers have access to the same technology for discovering and exploiting weaknesses at scale. Ginder's response was to develop WP Beacon, a tool that analyzes WordPress plugin repository data to identify potential supply chain threats before they cause widespread damage. ## 📰 Newsletter 🔍 **WordPress Security Alert**: Supply chain attacks are surging in the WordPress ecosystem! Austin Ginder from Anchor Hosting uncovered a disturbing trend where bad actors are purchasing legitimate plugins and weaponizing them to serve malware. One compromised plugin affected 20,000 sites before being caught. The game has changed: AI is now essential for both finding AND fixing security issues. Traditional security practices that worked until late 2023 are no longer sufficient. Austin recommends 100% AI-powered code auditing using advanced models like Claude Opus. Check out his new tool **WP Beacon** (wpbeacon.io) for detecting plugin supply chain risks, and consider implementing AI-assisted security audits for your WordPress sites. The investment in AI tools might seem expensive, but it's far cheaper than dealing with a compromised site! ## ✅ Action Items #### DevRel - Create educational content about supply chain attack recognition and prevention - Develop workshop curriculum on AI-assisted security auditing for WordPress developers - Partner with security companies to create developer-friendly scanning tools #### Community - Establish WordPress security working group focused on supply chain threats - Create plugin ownership transfer verification protocols - Develop community-driven plugin reputation scoring system #### WordPress - **Core**: Implement automated AI code scanning for all plugin submissions and updates - **Security**: Create supply chain attack response playbook and communication templates - **Plugins**: Develop enhanced vetting process for plugin ownership changes - **Meta**: Build plugin ownership change notification system for repository #### WordPress Security Team - Implement real-time AI analysis of plugin commits for malicious patterns - Create automated alerts for suspicious ownership transfers or rapid version changes - Develop forensic tooling to track bad actor patterns across multiple plugins ## 🧪 Hypotheses - AI-powered vulnerability scanning will become mandatory for WordPress hosting providers within 12 months - Supply chain attacks will shift toward more sophisticated obfuscation techniques as detection improves - The WordPress plugin review process will implement AI screening by 2025 - Traditional signature-based malware detection will be largely obsoleted by AI-powered analysis - Plugin ownership transfers will require enhanced verification similar to domain transfers ### 📊 Methodology - **Longitudinal analysis**: Track plugin ownership changes and correlate with security incidents over time - **Comparative study**: Analyze detection rates between traditional security tools and AI-powered analysis - **Cost-benefit analysis**: Compare investment in AI security tools versus incident response costs - **Pattern recognition**: Use machine learning to identify behavioral signatures of bad actors across plugins ### ❓ Questions - How can the WordPress ecosystem balance openness with security verification requirements? - What economic incentives drive bad actors to invest six figures in plugin acquisitions? - How might decentralized plugin distribution affect supply chain security? - Could plugin signing and verification systems prevent these attacks? - What role should hosting providers play in mandatory security scanning? ### 🔮 Future Research - Development of standardized plugin security scoring metrics - Analysis of international legal frameworks for plugin marketplace accountability - Investigation of blockchain-based plugin authenticity verification - Study of AI model evolution impact on vulnerability detection accuracy ### 💡 Implications - **Practice**: Security-first development workflows become standard, not optional - **Policy**: Plugin marketplaces may face increased regulatory scrutiny and liability - **Education**: WordPress developers need training in AI-assisted security analysis - **Funding**: Security tooling becomes significant operational expense for site management ### 🧠 Learning Styles Assessment **Reading level estimate**: Flesch-Kincaid Grade 12.3 - appropriate for technical professionals #### 👀 Visual learners - **Present**: Video format with screen sharing of security analysis tools - **Improve**: Attack flow diagrams, before/after code comparisons, dashboard screenshots #### 🔊 Aural learners - **Present**: Podcast interview format with detailed explanations - **Improve**: Audio-only version with enhanced narration of technical concepts #### 🗣️ Verbal learners - **Present**: Clear definitions of supply chain attacks, extensive analogies - **Improve**: Glossary of security terms, plain-language attack scenario explanations #### 🧩 Kinesthetic learners - **Present**: Mentions of hands-on scanning and investigation processes - **Improve**: Step-by-step security audit checklists, interactive scanning tutorials #### 🧠 Logical learners - **Present**: Timeline of discovery, systematic attack patterns, cause-effect relationships - **Improve**: Decision trees for security responses, quantified risk assessments #### 🧑‍🤝‍🧑 Social learners - **Present**: Community-focused discussion of security team collaboration - **Improve**: Security community guidelines, peer review processes for plugin safety #### 🧘‍♀️ Solitary learners - **Present**: Self-guided security scanning recommendations - **Improve**: Individual assessment tools, private security audit workflows ### 📊 Accessibility Assessment #### Screen reader semantics - **Present**: Clear heading structure, descriptive timestamps - **Improve**: Alt text for any security diagrams, ARIA labels for technical interfaces #### Keyboard navigation - **Present**: Standard video controls accessible via keyboard - **Improve**: Keyboard shortcuts for jumping between security topics #### Contrast and readability - **Present**: Video player with standard contrast controls - **Improve**: High-contrast mode for security dashboard interfaces ### 🌍 DEIB Assessment #### Cultural breadth - **Present**: Discussion includes international plugin marketplace (Flippa) - **Improve**: Examples from diverse regional WordPress communities #### Inclusive language - **Present**: Technical jargon explained, "bad actors" vs. stigmatizing terms - **Improve**: Plain-language security guidance for non-technical site owners #### Representation - **Present**: Focus on solo developer perspective - **Improve**: Include experiences from team-based and enterprise security workflows ### ✅ Logical Validity #### Strong reasoning - **Causal analysis**: Clear connection between AI advancement and security landscape changes (timestamps 3:12-8:45) - **Pattern recognition**: Systematic identification of attack vectors across multiple incidents - **Evidence-based conclusions**: Specific examples support general claims about supply chain vulnerabilities #### Fallacies - **Hasty generalization**: Claims about all WordPress security being inadequate based on specific attack types - could acknowledge that many traditional practices remain valuable - **Appeal to novelty**: Slight overemphasis on AI as solution without addressing potential AI limitations or false positives #### Tone of voice - **Collaborative and urgent**: Ginder positions himself as fellow community member sharing discoveries rather than security expert lecturing. Uses phrases like "I'm not a security expert" and emphasizes accidental discovery to build trust while conveying urgency about emerging threats. ### 🛡️ DARVO Analysis No DARVO patterns detected. Ginder consistently takes responsibility for security gaps in his own systems, credits the WordPress security team for quick responses, and positions attackers (not victims) as the problem. The discussion maintains focus on systemic solutions rather than blame assignment. ## 🎯 Conclusion WordPress supply chain attacks represent a fundamental shift in the threat landscape, enabled by AI tools that democratize both vulnerability discovery and exploitation. Austin Ginder's accidental discovery of systematic plugin compromise operations reveals the inadequacy of traditional security measures and highlights the urgent need for AI-powered defense strategies. The practical next steps for WordPress site owners are clear: implement comprehensive AI-assisted code auditing using advanced models, monitor plugin ownership changes, and prepare for a security landscape where 100% code verification becomes standard practice. For the broader WordPress ecosystem, this signals the need for enhanced plugin vetting processes and community-driven security intelligence sharing. --- ## Full Transcript [00:00] Hi everyone, and welcome to the WP [00:02] Minute. I'm Eric Karkovack. [00:04] Today's episode is all about security. [00:07] Specifically, we'll look at the recent [00:09] supply chain attacks impacting dozens of [00:11] WordPress plugins. [00:13] Austin Ginder is here to help us sort [00:15] things out. Austin is the owner of [00:17] Anchor Hosting and the author of WP [00:20] Beacon, a new tool that aims to identify [00:22] supply chain risks. Austin, welcome to [00:25] the WP Minute. [00:27] Hey, thanks for having me. And uh [00:30] uh yeah, happy to talk about this [00:32] subject and particularly this last month [00:34] has been a wild ride for me. I [00:38] just need to say up front like I'm not a [00:40] security expert. I'm just a developer [00:43] armed with AI and it is just [00:46] it's crazy times we're living in. [00:48] Yeah, absolutely. And and I I think it's [00:51] it's interesting that, you know, [00:53] I I can go back like the first time I [00:55] heard about one of these supply chain [00:57] attacks was actually I was looking it [00:58] up, it was 2017 and there was a plugin [01:01] that changed hands that had um you know, [01:04] some malicious code added in there. Um [01:08] but we'll we'll get to that, but I [01:10] wanted to start with um [01:12] you know, you did a lot of research, it [01:15] sounds like, on what was happening [01:17] um on these supply chain attacks. What [01:21] got you interested in this and um [01:24] can you give us a little bit of [01:25] background on on what you found? [01:28] Yeah, so I think it's important to note [01:31] that most of what I've been finding is [01:34] completely by accident. I've been very [01:36] lucky. [01:37] So, the backstory really is story about [01:40] AI and how everything kind of changed at [01:42] the beginning of this year. For me [01:44] personally, [01:45] uh like I I was a very heavy [01:48] user of uh generating code with AI all [01:52] last year. I used Google Gemini for a [01:55] while. [01:56] But I didn't really use agent until for [01:58] the first time until around February. [02:01] When I used an agent, CloudFlare [02:04] specifically, that's kind of when [02:06] everything [02:07] just started to get really crazy. Like [02:09] I'm [02:11] Uh for my business, if I take a step [02:13] back, so I manage around 3,000 WordPress [02:16] sites. [02:18] I'm a [02:19] solo developer. I have some people that [02:22] help me out from time to time, but the [02:24] business is me. I'm I'm I'm a one-man [02:27] shop. [02:29] I had a huge influx of sites getting [02:32] hacked and malware [02:33] uh as a byproduct of thanks to everyone [02:36] having the superpower called AI. [02:39] And um [02:40] so [02:42] uh February was a month of patching [02:44] things up, getting things in a in a in a [02:47] better place. [02:49] Uh March was a lot of um [02:53] all right, what can we do to [02:55] uh actually go on the offense, like [02:58] build redo my entire security system. [03:02] And um [03:03] and then in April, I started to reap [03:06] some benefits from that. So, [03:08] going back to the supply chain attack, [03:10] the first one that I discovered was just [03:13] a byproduct of me doing malware cleanup [03:15] on my own customers. [03:17] And um [03:18] >> Okay. [03:18] what you can do with CloudFlare [03:20] specifically [03:22] uh with malware cleanup is just [03:24] absolutely phenomenal. Like you can You [03:27] can just keep digging and you can keep [03:29] uncovering stuff. So, [03:32] uh previous malware I [03:34] you know, if a WordPress site gets a [03:36] malware infection, you know, you can [03:37] restore from backup. [03:39] Uh you can fix things up. You can get a [03:41] developer involved. But you really don't [03:43] get to the [03:45] um very rarely do you get to uncover the [03:47] whole story. Like this is how the hacker [03:50] actually got into your site and this is [03:52] what they did, and this is the line of [03:55] code that [03:57] was the reason why everything was [03:59] vulnerable in the first place. [04:01] Well, with AI, [04:02] you can just do crazy forensics level [04:06] uh uncoverings [04:08] uh to the point of Okay, this is exactly [04:11] where it happened. And this is how it [04:13] happened. [04:14] And we can just patch those codes. And [04:17] it's all in in a conversation with with [04:20] with working with cloud code. [04:22] Um [04:23] So, anyway, uh the [04:25] the supply chain tax, it was literally [04:28] just kept digging. Like, how did this [04:30] happen? All right, let's expand the [04:32] scope. Let's look at the plugins. Let's [04:35] look at the author of the plugin. Let's [04:37] look at what's going on. [04:39] Oh, I think there's something here. I [04:41] should probably reach out to the [04:43] WordPress community uh the WordPress [04:45] plugin team [04:46] uh to report this as an issue. So, [04:48] that's That's how I got started. And [04:50] that was like a month ago. [04:53] And so, that that [04:55] That's quite a story. I mean, cuz [04:58] I I honestly I'll I'll tell you I don't [04:59] feel as bad now that I've had sites [05:01] hacked cuz if I know you're pretty [05:02] You're pretty darn good developer. So, [05:04] if you've had sites hacked, I don't feel [05:06] nearly as as dumb now. [05:08] >> [laughter] [05:08] >> So, thank you for that. The playbook for [05:11] keeping your site secure just [05:13] uh completely uh changes this year in [05:16] particular because [05:18] I was doing all the right things. Um you [05:20] know, I run a very strict uh ship. I [05:25] update all my customer sites every week. [05:28] I run backups. I run long-term backups. [05:31] I run um [05:33] uh an entirely different uh revision [05:36] history system so that I can catch [05:38] followable changes immediately. So, [05:41] I was doing all the right things. And I [05:43] I would say that was good advice up [05:45] until about October, November of last [05:48] year. [05:49] Okay. [05:50] >> And that device started to fall short [05:51] because people got really good AI. [05:55] And you could just scan for [05:57] vulnerabilities and you could find [05:58] stuff. [06:00] Going back to my main point, like I I'm [06:02] not really a security expert. Like I've [06:04] historically not submitted uh [06:08] things to security teams to get patched. [06:11] Well, with the AI, I'm finding them all [06:12] the time. Like you're you're on a scan [06:14] on a site, and it's like, "Oh, well, [06:16] this this block of code is vulnerable. I [06:19] should probably report that." So, I [06:21] tell Cloudflare, "Hey, draft this [06:23] findings up to the author." It kicks out [06:25] an email draft. I'm like, "That looks [06:27] good. Send." [06:29] Well, if they're a real team, they get [06:31] back to you right away. They're like, [06:32] "Oh, thank you for letting us know. [06:34] >> [laughter] [06:35] >> Uh this will be patched uh in the next [06:37] few days." [06:38] Uh so, [06:41] yeah, like it it's it's I think um [06:44] the big takeaway is things have changed. [06:47] So, like not just me, but like everyone [06:50] needs to up their game when it comes to [06:51] security, and the rules are just getting [06:53] rewritten [06:54] right in front front of our eyes. [06:57] Yes, it seems like the same old cat and [06:59] mouse game that we've been playing for [07:00] years, but now with maybe on steroids [07:04] with these AI tools that [07:06] um [07:07] as you said, I mean, you can actually go [07:09] in and see that [07:10] what what vulnerable code there is, but [07:12] also a hacker could do the same thing, [07:13] right? If they're if they want to target [07:16] a certain plugin or a certain site, they [07:17] they absolutely can do that. [07:20] Yep. [07:22] Some of these [07:24] um [07:24] discoveries have been dormant for years. [07:27] Uh [07:31] And also, like [07:34] uh part of my new process is I'm [07:36] uh I aim to get 100% code audited for [07:40] all of my customers, and that's kind of [07:42] difficult for me to do, uh, but I'm [07:44] making progress. I'm getting there. [07:49] During this process, it's like a house [07:51] cleaning. Like I'm uncovering things [07:54] that have been planted there for years. [07:56] Like PHP backdoors, [07:58] um, [07:59] things that, you know, all the classical [08:01] security systems have missed. [08:03] Uh, because [08:05] a security system at the end of the day [08:07] is is just as smart as whatever [08:09] uh, [08:11] fingerprint you give it. Like, "Hey, [08:12] look for things that do this." [08:14] But with AI, it's kind of like [08:16] human-level intelligence to evaluate is [08:19] this thing a real threat or not? And, [08:22] um, that's the difference. [08:25] I was going to say, I mean, this this [08:26] security tools that we have now, I know [08:28] I know and I know you're you're into [08:30] hosting and and [08:32] you know, hosts have their their their [08:33] scanning tools that they use at the [08:35] server level. We have things like [08:36] Cloudflare. [08:38] Um, and at the at the I guess at the, [08:41] uh, [08:42] basic level, we have security plugins [08:44] that we all put on our sites and those [08:46] all do something, right? But [08:49] yet [08:50] thing after thing after thing is missed [08:52] and sites still get hacked. [08:55] Um, so you can't always find these [08:56] little backdoors that are hidden in [08:58] there. I [08:59] Like [09:01] anything surprise you with this or or is [09:04] this kind of what you expected to find? [09:07] Uh, I was shocked at how bad things [09:09] were. I am still very optimistic [09:11] because, [09:13] uh, [09:14] I feel like things are going to get bad [09:16] and then things are going to get really [09:18] good because [09:20] it this is all stuff that was hidden in [09:22] the dark and once we just [09:25] shine some light, they're like, "Oh, I [09:26] didn't realize how bad it was." Well, [09:28] that's not really the problem. The [09:29] problem is we just we we need to clean [09:32] it up and then we're going to be set for [09:34] the future. So, [09:36] uh, and also this is not a WordPress [09:38] problem. [09:39] All code is suffering through this. [09:41] Like, if you look on any security [09:43] bulletin board, any software, Linux, any [09:46] OS, [09:47] we're all They're all dealing with the [09:49] same thing. It's just like we didn't [09:51] realize how much bad code there was out [09:53] there in the world. And now we can [09:57] just press a few buttons, a few [09:58] conversations with a chatbot, and like [10:01] see it. It's all there. [10:04] So, [10:06] tell me a little bit about, um, [10:08] the genesis of WP Beacon. So, it's [10:10] wpbeacon.io, [10:12] right? Yeah. [10:13] >> This site, um, [10:16] go goes and kind of looks for patterns, [10:18] right? It's looking for ownership [10:20] changes and and SVN, uh, changes and [10:24] things like that. [10:26] Uh, so [10:28] So, I, uh, [10:30] WP Beacon is a name I've had for a [10:32] while. I've, you know, I've lots of [10:34] names. [10:36] But, the idea for WP Beacon really came [10:38] a couple weeks ago when I was dealing [10:40] with the, uh, the larger findings about, [10:44] uh, WordPress plugins that were being [10:46] operated by either bad actors or [10:49] other other things that were going that [10:51] were harming people's websites. So, [10:53] uh, [10:55] after about two or three of these major [10:58] findings and getting a lot of uh, [11:01] press around that, I'm like, you know, [11:04] I want to actually find one of these on [11:06] purpose. Like, I'm I'm just stumbling in [11:08] the dark and finding stuff on accident, [11:10] like cleaning up a site or finding uh, [11:13] one of them I uncovered because I wrote [11:16] some tools to scan my [11:19] customers' plugins for variants. So, I [11:21] was I was specifically looking for [11:24] is there a batch of plugins that are [11:26] running a version of the plugin that [11:28] isn't the official version? And I found [11:31] one. It was It was I'm like, "Well, [11:32] that's weird." And then that [11:34] um led to what what had happened. So, [11:38] a lot of what what happens with [11:40] WordPress plugin repos, [11:42] uh when there's bad actors, a common [11:45] trait that they they do is they will [11:48] try to hijack the update system, meaning [11:50] they sneak an updater into the plugin. [11:53] You download it off of wordpress.org, [11:55] and then [11:56] they hijack it off of wordpress.org [11:59] so that they can give uh malware. So, if [12:02] you're trying to scan for malware on [12:05] wordpress.org, it's very difficult [12:07] because it's not there. [12:09] What's happening with the supply chain [12:10] attacks, your clean version got replaced [12:13] with a version as malware. [12:17] Um [12:18] so after about a couple of these [12:19] stumbling through, I'm like, "I want to [12:21] see if I can try to find one." So, [12:23] that's why I started work on WP Beacon [12:26] last month. Uh uh like I said, the name [12:30] I've had for years. I've always wanted [12:32] to do something in that space of either [12:35] code verification or finding, and it it [12:38] just felt like the right [12:40] uh idea for the right name. [12:42] Um [12:43] uh so, I started to write uh very crude [12:46] AI [12:47] maybe some people would call it AI slop. [12:50] I'm just throwing ideas at AI. I'm like, [12:52] "Hey, download everything we can on um [12:55] from the [12:56] wordpress.org repo. Uh download [12:59] everything we have information about the [13:01] committers. Uh here's some code patterns [13:03] of [13:04] common ways that bad actors hijack their [13:07] own plugins. Let's look for them." So, I [13:10] I I just like pulled it all into my [13:11] laptop and just like created this thing [13:14] uh trying to scan for things. [13:16] And I had my first hit, and it was uh [13:21] um [13:22] when I was scanning the top 2,000 [13:25] plugins on the wordpress.org repo. [13:29] For context, uh that might not seem like [13:31] that many plugins, but it's actually a [13:34] lot of plugins. [13:36] I forget the numbers off the top of my [13:39] head, but like there's right, there's [13:40] over 60,000 plugins [13:43] out there. [13:43] >> Yeah, [13:44] that's a lot of installs. It it it it's [13:46] a lot, but like if you take let's say [13:49] the 10,000th [13:50] plugin, uh the top 10,000 plugins, well, [13:54] it's only got 400 installs. So, what I'm [13:57] saying is by targeting the top 2,000 [13:59] plugins, [14:00] it's actually hitting most websites. And [14:04] then beyond that, it starts to trickle [14:06] off. [14:08] So, I I ran a scan, it found something. [14:11] This is just using client code on my [14:12] laptop. I'm like, "Wow, I actually found [14:15] one. And it's live. Like it's it it it [14:18] was uh [14:23] pull it up. The School Top was at 20,000 [14:25] installs. So, it was like live and [14:29] running a hijacked version on 20,000 [14:32] WordPress sites. I'm like, "This is [14:33] insane." [14:35] >> So, I reported to the WordPress plugin [14:37] team, and by now they know me because [14:40] this is like the fourth [14:41] the third or fourth time I've interacted [14:43] with them in the last month. And and [14:45] they're like, "Oh, thank you for the [14:47] report." And they closed it out and uh [14:49] issued a um [14:51] a [14:53] patch to kind of follow what I was [14:55] seeing. They were doing some weird stuff [14:56] with version numbers. [14:58] Uh so, [15:00] the version on wordpress.org was was a [15:03] certain point, and the version that got [15:05] installed was a couple points above [15:06] that. So, like the WordPress team [15:08] followed my guidelines or or some of my [15:11] ideas and decided to bump it way up both [15:14] of them. So, the compromised version. [15:17] But, the thing about these the WordPress [15:20] plugin team [15:22] is kind of limited in what they can do, [15:23] right? They can [15:26] They are very able to [15:29] uh they've been awesome to work with. [15:31] That they're very quick to shut this [15:33] down once it's discovered. [15:35] They're very quick to even put a patch [15:37] out. [15:38] But a patch in in this scenario is is [15:42] is unfortunately not going to hit most [15:44] of these sites because most of these [15:45] customers are already hijacked off. [15:48] So So the cleanup pro- processes is left [15:51] to the site owners. [15:53] Um so [15:55] and that's what these bad actors are [15:56] going for. They want to compromise [15:58] sites, they want to keep them [15:59] compromised for as long as possible so [16:01] that they can get whatever they want out [16:03] of it, whether that's serving spam ads [16:06] or SEO [16:08] uh [16:09] uh junk, you know, whatever they're [16:11] trying to do. [16:12] Yeah, so that that patched version just [16:15] just to be clear, we we we still have [16:18] the back door in there, right? I mean, [16:20] the the the plugin itself is no longer [16:22] vulnerable, but whatever back door may [16:24] have been installed is still going to be [16:26] sitting there dormant until it's not and [16:29] then you're getting casino spam on your [16:31] site or or your Google results are [16:33] poisoned by [16:35] that that type of junk. Right. So So the [16:37] trick is [16:39] catching some of these before they're [16:40] activated. So this was hardwired to do [16:44] do a content delivery system where it [16:46] will display content, but that server [16:50] was never active. It was dormant. It was [16:52] hardwired. And it was plugged in, you [16:55] the bad actor would maybe even sold [16:58] positions. Like, "Oh, I've got this [16:59] compromised servers, but it was never [17:01] activated." [17:02] So when we shut it down, uh I uh also [17:05] reached out to my friend Sal. He used to [17:07] work for Ken Stofer now does uh some [17:10] security stuff on the side and um [17:12] he was able to get all those compromised [17:15] servers turned off. So they don't have [17:16] any foothold on those sites. [17:20] Well done. Well done. Oh my gosh, it's [17:22] it's nice to actually hear a happy story [17:25] >> [laughter] [17:25] >> about this stuff. [17:27] >> So some sometimes you can do something [17:29] about it. [17:30] That's kind of outside of my expertise, [17:32] but if you ping the right person, you [17:34] can get things done. [17:36] Um [17:37] uh [17:39] uh but yeah, like going back to like [17:41] WordPress security team and WP Beacon [17:44] the project itself. So I built WP Beacon [17:47] to try to find some myself. And I I see [17:50] them solving [17:52] uh they're coming at at it from two [17:54] different vantage points. Like they are [17:57] very complimentary. [17:59] Um WP Beacon I feel is like a how much [18:02] data can we harvest out of things [18:05] out of these supply chain attacks that [18:07] previously would be would have been [18:09] impossible to pull out. [18:11] Uh so one of you running one of these [18:14] uh audits, it's able to chain together [18:18] many layers of details that was [18:20] previously missed. Like here is the [18:23] exact pattern. Here's when they created [18:24] the WordPress account. Here's the [18:26] domains they're using and here's how [18:27] it's all interlinked together. And even [18:30] uh over the past weekend [18:32] I uncovered one um [18:36] um a supply chain attack that [18:40] uh WordPress [18:42] plugin team closed off about a month [18:43] ago. [18:45] But it was able to correlate it to other [18:47] ones over the years and different [18:50] WordPress profiles been pulled together. [18:52] So that one's wild. I mean that's like [18:55] this guy's been operating uh compromised [18:57] servers for 13 years. [18:59] And no one's correlated [19:01] >> No one's correlated the data because Oh [19:03] my gosh. [19:03] >> it it would have been impossible to sift [19:06] through all the information to figure it [19:07] out, but if you have AI and you can [19:09] point it in the the direction, it can [19:11] start to pull it all together. So, I [19:14] mean, that's kind of my hope for WP [19:15] Beacon is just to like [19:18] expose some of these incidents and maybe [19:21] start to like have um [19:24] uh [19:26] uh it would be great if it could [19:28] proactively find situations where bad [19:31] actors have things wired up and take [19:34] them down before any damage is done. [19:37] Yeah, I mean, cuz right now, I mean, we [19:39] have, you know, plugins change hands all [19:41] the time, right? I mean, we we have, you [19:43] know, acquisitions all all the time. [19:47] But, we [19:48] I don't know if there's any process in [19:50] place to really um you know, verify any [19:53] of that stuff, right? I mean, like [19:55] a anybody can take over a plugin and do [19:58] something, you know, malicious with it, [20:01] right? I [20:02] Do you see anything else we could be [20:04] doing that, you know, when a plugin [20:07] changes hands like this [20:09] is there something that, you know, maybe [20:11] the plugins team could do or AI could [20:14] automatically check that, you know, [20:16] we're making sure that this person is on [20:18] the up and up and that the code [20:20] that they're committing is safe? [20:24] Yeah, I think I think this is eventually [20:25] going to be implemented kind of across [20:27] the entire industry and that is having [20:29] AI audit the code. Uh so, like from the [20:32] WordPress submission point of view, I [20:35] think [20:36] they can shut it down future cases [20:39] by having AI do a multi-level check. Are [20:43] there any [20:44] updates libraries that goes against the [20:48] uh the codes of services or the uh the [20:51] requirements that are outlined on [20:54] wordpress.org? [20:55] Um are there any office gated update [20:58] libraries? Because some of these are [20:59] very well hidden. It's not like you just [21:02] search for a certain filter and you see [21:05] all the updaters. No, they're doing [21:07] crazy stuff. [21:08] They are doing bad things [21:11] and they're trying to hide their tracks. [21:13] And some of them are doing a phenomenal [21:15] job. So, [21:16] so I think from [21:18] yeah, two-phase like [21:20] the plugin repo or the plugin team [21:24] they do have the ability to stop this [21:27] happening at the front door, but that [21:29] doesn't [21:30] mean like it's but what's really hard is [21:33] like figuring out the stuff that's [21:35] already submitted. [21:37] Because [21:38] to do that, that's that's a full code [21:40] audit. That's that's going to be a [21:41] massive project. [21:43] Uh it's just like [21:44] >> With 60,000 plugins, it's not going to [21:46] be kind of impossible, right? Yep. Yeah, [21:48] it's so so like I guess one or two [21:51] things like I think the low-hanging [21:53] fruit is let's see if we can stop it [21:57] up front and then what that would look [21:58] like is every code that gets pushed up [22:00] to SVN [22:02] has to get uh AI code audit look over [22:06] and see the diff and see see if there's [22:09] anything harmful being applied. And now [22:11] that'll that'll stop it right out of the [22:13] gate. [22:14] And then there's the big project and [22:16] this is going to be a very expensive [22:17] project. Run the whole wordpress.org [22:21] plugin repo through a full 100% code [22:23] audit. And that's going to uncover a [22:26] whole bunch of mess. [22:28] Um [22:30] because [22:31] these guys use different techniques and [22:34] so I uh [22:37] uh it's it's it's just going to require [22:39] uh [22:40] uh more thorough depth. Now, from WP [22:42] Beacon, what I'm mostly interested is [22:45] how many of these cases can I search and [22:48] do let the AI do the investigation [22:51] report [22:53] and surface that because the more that [22:54] that gets publicized [22:57] the [22:59] uh it's going going be a lot harder in [23:01] the future for someone to pull off [23:03] hardware in a whole bunch of WordPress [23:05] sites to a compromised server. [23:09] Yeah, that's definitely the hope. If you [23:10] can [23:12] as I I put something in our newsletter [23:14] about this and I thought, "Well, if you [23:15] can detect these patterns, certain [23:17] patterns of of what's happening." Cuz it [23:19] seems like there is like a same basic [23:21] backstory, right? With these with these [23:23] compromised plugins. [23:25] If you can kind of spot that before it [23:27] really gets deployed, you have at least [23:31] a shot to stop it in its tracks and save [23:34] a lot of people a lot of money and a lot [23:35] of trouble. [23:37] Uh what one quick side story. Um [23:40] so because uh [23:43] um [23:45] Ironically, the post that I wrote that [23:47] went viral, [23:49] I had uh like [23:52] I didn't do anything. [23:53] >> [laughter] [23:54] >> I mean, this this the side story was one [23:56] of my customers reached out because he [23:58] saw the notice from WordPress.org. [24:01] So, the someone in the community re [24:04] reported [24:06] an issue and got the essential plugin [24:08] suite of plugins uh closed down. So, [24:10] it's like a batch of 30-plus plugins. [24:13] Well, one of my customer sites got [24:15] compromised. [24:17] Now, my my malware scanner would have [24:18] picked it up within 24 hours and would [24:20] have sent me a notice and I would have [24:21] cleaned it up, but it just happened that [24:24] morning that [24:26] uh one of my agencies [24:28] Kiki, the developer on staff, [24:32] he caught the thing. He saw the notice [24:34] about from the WordPress plugin team, [24:37] notified me. I ran the scan. I was like, [24:38] "Yep, it's compromised. The WP-config [24:40] file has been tampered with." [24:43] Just kept digging in and [24:45] I did the investigation work and then [24:47] put out the story, but I didn't do [24:49] anything. Like, it was all code code. I [24:51] was just doing malware cleanup. [24:53] And put it out there. [24:54] Um [24:55] and [24:56] uh [24:58] Like, I literally didn't do anything. [24:59] >> [laughter] [25:01] >> I [25:02] I I I was there with my [25:04] >> the curiosity to look, though. I I was [25:06] having a conversation. At the end of it, [25:07] I'm like, this is wild. Be- like Cloud [25:10] Code did the research. It went and found [25:12] the Flippa article where this team [25:15] purchased the suite of 30 plus plugins [25:18] for six figures on Flippa. [25:21] And, uh from um I think it was a [25:24] uh team in India uh [25:27] that sold sold the company off. [25:29] And then, they weaponized most of the [25:32] plugins. And, uh I think the [25:34] WordPress.org team [25:36] is is high praise for this because from [25:38] what I saw, most sites did not get [25:41] compromised. Like, it was a huge Like, I [25:44] I can't see it any other way. I I think [25:46] it was an epic failure for the one who's [25:49] doing the compromising because [25:51] um [25:53] high-profile locked the sites wired up, [25:56] and [25:57] uh like, it was like one in 20 actually [26:02] got compromised on my sites. And, most [26:04] of them [26:05] like, they didn't even have a chance to [26:06] roll the the compromise out to all their [26:08] plugins. They were in the process of [26:10] rolling it out when WordPress shut them [26:11] off. [26:12] >> Okay. So, it it wasn't that like all 30 [26:15] of them got weaponized, but he was [26:17] systematically going through it and [26:19] doing that. [26:21] I uh [26:21] >> It's just [26:22] insane to think about it. And then, you [26:24] know, obviously they they paid a good [26:26] bit of money for those plugins. Right. [26:28] [laughter] And to to um we always talk [26:31] about here like, well, how do we make [26:32] money in the plugin business? Well, this [26:34] is one way, I guess, but not the way you [26:36] really should be making [laughter] money [26:38] in the plugin space these days. Uh it [26:41] it's crazy cuz I always think of it as, [26:42] okay, it's just one rogue actor with one [26:44] plugin. [26:46] But, to have a suite of 30 plus of them [26:48] is just a little bit insane. Um [26:52] so, [26:53] bringing this back to the rest of us, [26:55] like [26:56] as as hosts, developers, site owners, [27:00] like what should we be doing? Is there [27:02] anything we could be doing right now [27:05] to kind of [27:06] tighten the screws a little bit on [27:08] security? [27:10] Yeah, I I think my advice for the plugin [27:12] repo [27:14] um [27:15] holds for everyone. Like my process [27:18] moving forward is everything needs to be [27:20] 100% code audited. [27:23] And what that means is going to look [27:25] different for the size organization [27:28] you're running. [27:29] Uh for myself, I manage 3,000 sites. The [27:33] way I'm doing it is I have Cloud Code [27:36] run a scan. Uh it's a vulnerability [27:38] scan. Malware is a little bit different, [27:40] but it will pick up malware. That's not [27:42] what this is for. This is sort of like [27:44] looking for [27:46] code that it is easily [27:49] uh vulnerable. [27:50] And um you can do this yourself. Um it [27:54] is [27:55] if you download a backup of your [27:57] WordPress site and you have access to [27:59] Cloud Code, [28:00] you literally just sit ask Cloud Code, [28:03] "Hey, look over my files [28:06] line by line for security [28:08] vulnerabilities." And you might have to [28:10] prod it a few times to get it to do the [28:13] line by line because the line by line is [28:15] expensive. So, [28:18] uh most WordPress sites are going to [28:20] have I I'm not even sure. Hundreds of [28:23] thousands of lines of code. Um so it's [28:27] going to burn through tokens is what I [28:28] mean. I think any anyone on a $20 a [28:31] month plan can get through one site. [28:34] That's that's fine. [28:36] It's It's a lot of tokens. On my $200 a [28:39] month plan, I can get through many, many [28:41] batches before I um [28:44] eat up my usage. But almost all my [28:46] excess usage for Cloud Code goes to [28:48] this. It's like when I'm when I'm done [28:50] for the day, I'm I'm burning scans. [28:54] So, I'm I'm doing it a little bit more [28:56] systematic. So, I [28:58] I um every plugin or theme, I create a [29:03] unique hash for. [29:05] So, I only run the audit once. If if [29:07] Jetpack version whatever is installed on [29:10] uh [29:11] uh a bunch of my customer sites, I audit [29:13] that version of the plugin one time and [29:16] I mark it in the system and it never [29:18] gets audited again because I've I've got [29:20] that. I mean, I might run it through a [29:23] uh a better [29:25] uh AI model in the future, [29:28] but it's it's audit once [29:31] uh and move on to the next. [29:34] And it it is just wild how many things [29:37] I've uncovered for for my own sites, uh [29:40] how many have led to a direct security [29:42] patch, [29:43] um [29:44] uh so so I think that's what you just [29:47] need to do. Like, if you want confidence [29:48] that your site's secure, just ask AI to [29:50] do it. I will say one recommendation [29:53] tip, there is a very [29:56] big difference with with these AI models [29:59] in its ability to detect threats. [30:02] So, I would only run the audits with the [30:04] most expensive model. So, for me, I'm [30:06] using Opus 4.7. [30:10] I don't trust anything else. Uh [30:12] I would I would either either that level [30:15] or higher, not that level or lower. [30:17] Like, yeah, you can use the Deep Seek [30:20] Deep Seek Pro models or the Kimmy K2 uh [30:24] series for other tasks, but not this. [30:27] The security audits re [30:29] qua uh [30:30] they [30:31] they just they catch more things. And [30:34] for security, it's it [30:35] you need the best set of eyes uh to to [30:38] look it over. [30:40] Yeah, I wouldn't want to I mean, I these [30:42] models change so much in such a short [30:44] amount of time. So, you probably [30:46] wouldn't want to use the chat GPT model [30:48] from 3 years ago. Right. To to look at [30:51] this. Um [30:53] So, I mean, what Do you have any plans [30:56] for anything else coming to WP Beacon? [31:00] Any other like uh wish list items that [31:03] that you're hoping to to add? [31:06] So, I think WP Beacon as it stands right [31:08] now is uh a gap that's a [31:13] kind of unique uh because you have [31:16] um [31:17] there's a lot of good security companies [31:19] out there doing fantastic work on on the [31:22] code uh side of things. But, I want to [31:25] keep WP Beacon sort of separate from [31:28] that [31:29] um because there's nothing looking for [31:32] bad actors and like trying to learn from [31:34] that. And I think there's value in there [31:36] being [31:38] uh [31:39] a database forensics style for the bad [31:43] actors. [31:45] So, I have lots of ideas around [31:47] code audits and hashing and I'm already [31:49] doing that in my business. That'll [31:51] probably be a separate project [31:53] um outside of WP Beacon. [31:57] Uh but I but [31:59] yeah, like I I I I think there's just [32:03] value in doing these investigative [32:05] investigative research into how these [32:09] guys are operating and my hope is [32:11] it just becomes a thing that doesn't get [32:14] used. Like we we find all the bad actors [32:17] and then WP Beacon doesn't have a [32:18] purpose. Like that's [32:20] sort of what I would hope to happen over [32:23] the next 3 to 6 months as AI gets rolled [32:26] out. [32:27] That sounds like a nice idea. You know, [32:29] we don't we have this a great security [32:31] tool, but we don't need it anymore. We [32:32] we've already figured it out. But, [32:34] probably not. Um Yeah. [32:37] >> [laughter] [32:37] >> Yeah, [32:38] as security goes, like whenever [32:41] it's an arms race, right? Like everyone [32:43] tries to one-up the other. So, it's it's [32:46] usually a never-ending battle, but [32:48] we'll see. [32:50] Yeah, I mean it I'm happy to see you [32:52] using AI in such a positive way to to [32:54] make it like, you know, an actual good [32:57] difference uh for, you know, so many [32:59] people, so many site owners, so many [33:00] developers. [33:02] Cuz, you know, I mean there's always [33:03] that balance, right? Because somebody's [33:04] going to use it to do bad things, and [33:06] somebody's going to use it to do good [33:07] things. So, you you've you've uncovered [33:09] something I mean I'm I'm sure 6 months [33:11] ago you probably had no idea that this [33:13] is where you would be and what you would [33:15] be doing. Not at all. [33:17] >> [laughter] [33:18] >> So, it's it's awesome that you you had [33:20] the mind to just dig into this. I know [33:22] you give Claude all the credit, but I [33:23] mean someone had to type that prompt in [33:25] there, right? And someone had to have [33:27] the curiosity just to say, "I want to [33:29] know more about this." [33:31] So, kudos to you on that. So, I I I [33:33] encourage everyone to check out WP [33:35] wpbeacon.io. [33:37] Um where else can folks uh reach out to [33:40] you online? [33:42] I am on X at austinginder.com [33:46] or all the [clears throat] places if you [33:47] search my name. [33:48] Um [33:49] anchor.host is where I mostly do my blog [33:53] post uh through Anchor Hosting's sites. [33:57] And um [33:58] uh yeah. [34:01] All right. Well, we'll be sure to put [34:02] those uh posts up in the uh show notes, [34:05] too, because it it's really incredible [34:06] what you found when looking through [34:08] these plugins. And you cite a lot of [34:10] examples in there. So, I think anybody [34:11] interested in security or just uh [34:15] wants to know what in the heck is [34:16] running in the background in their site, [34:18] uh will be very interested to know. Um [34:21] but Austin, thank you so much for for [34:23] being a part of this, and thanks to [34:24] everyone for watching and listening. [34:27] Visit us over at the [34:28] wpminute.com/subscribe, [34:30] grab our newsletter, and uh support the [34:32] work that we do here at the WP Minute. [34:35] Thank you, and we'll see you next time.  📄 **Full text:** ![[Full Document Contents/Articles/Inside the Surge of WordPress Supply Chain Attacks.md|Inside the Surge of WordPress Supply Chain Attacks by YouTube]] ## Highlights - operated by either bad actors or other other things that were going that were harming people's websites. So, uh, after about two or three of these major findings and getting a lot of uh, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01kt1hx3mzkx49n7533p95rch0)) - Note: Mechanism: bad actors take over WordPress plugin repos to harm sites via the update system. - Tags: atom/literature/h1 - "Hey, look over my files line by line for security vulnerabilities." And you might have to prod it a few times to get it to do the line by line because the line by line is expensive. So, uh most WordPress sites are going to have I I'm not even sure. Hundreds of thousands of lines of code. Um so it's going to burn through tokens is what I mean. I think any anyone on a $20 a ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01kt1hx9h9scxja83rjp4qemx2)) - Note: Defense: have Claude Code audit files line-by-line for security vulnerabilities. - Tags: atom/literature/h2