# How The 1979 Revolution Transformed Iran  ## Episode metadata - Episode title: How The 1979 Revolution Transformed Iran - Show: Fresh Air - Owner / Host: NPR - Guests: [Scott Anderson](https://share.snipd.com/person/1875dcb4-885c-4e28-9f99-8a5715f5aa29) - Episode publish date: 2025-08-04 - Episode AI description: Scott Anderson, a veteran war correspondent and author of 'King of Kings', dives into the transformative impact of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. He discusses how the U.S. failed to predict shifts in Iran’s political climate, highlighting critical missteps by American policymakers. The conversation reveals the tensions between the Shah and rising anti-regime sentiments, alongside the internal chaos within the Iranian military. Anderson emphasizes the lasting effects of the revolution on U.S.-Iran relations and the geopolitical landscape. - Mentioned books: [King of Kings](https://share.snipd.com/book/77820287-9275-428e-a385-610ba74dd9d0) by [Mark Driscoll](https://share.snipd.com/person/dc669b2f-8bdf-4da8-8874-c1ffa3bc2bda) - Duration: 44:41 - Episode URL: [Open in Snipd](https://share.snipd.com/episode/39bd77b9-f658-4c92-979d-baceb387803f) - Show URL: [Open in Snipd](https://share.snipd.com/show/74968254-1b39-42d5-89fb-0ba0e44cf3a3) - Export date: 2026-02-17T23:24:34 ## Snips ### [Violent Protests in Washington DC 1977](https://share.snipd.com/snip/2b08f76e-d3e5-4fc5-a224-569398d4dd6d) 🎧 02:48 - 04:18 (01:29) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/6cf038ed-520a-481a-a34a-19ced2963130" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Scott Anderson witnessed violent protests during the Shah's 1977 visit to Washington, D.C. - The tear gas used made Iranians interpret that the U.S. was distancing itself from the Shah. #### 💬 Quote > A lot of Iranians saw this as a move by the Americans to distance themselves from the Shah. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson describing protests during the Shah's 1977 visit to Washington, D.C. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** Sure. Yeah. So it was mid-November of 1977 that the Shah came on a state visit and some 4,000 anti-Shah demonstrators, mostly Iranian students studying in the United States, arrived Washington to protest his visit. And meanwhile, the Iranian government had shipped in pro-Shah demonstrators to kind of face off with him. And so when the Shah arrived and he had just reached the White House, all of a sudden there was a pitch battle on the ellipse, the ellipse being this great lawn just below the White House. And I happened to be there. I was kind of wandering around. I was stationed at the Treasury headquarters, which is right next door to the White House. And I had just wandered over and I was kind of in no man's land between these two groups, the and the pro-Shaw demonstrators. And all of a sudden, the two sides broke through the snow fencing that was keeping them back and charged each other. And I happened to be at ground zero. I got knocked to the ground. Well, a lot of people got knocked to the ground. It turned out to be the most violent day of civil unrest in Washington, D.C., in almost a decade. And the thing about this day was, unfortunately for the Shah, it was being shown on live TV back in Iran. And the way a lot of people interpreted this event, and there was tear gassed, the Shah and President Carter were tear gassed on the South Lawn. A lot of Iranians saw this as a move by the Americans to distance themselves from the Shah. --- ### [Shah's Complex Rule](https://share.snipd.com/snip/81225de6-53d4-4aef-b6ca-388a031ebb75) 🎧 05:00 - 06:33 (01:32) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/bfd7198f-75e2-4e1f-b7a4-9644ac98d440" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - The Shah tried to modernize Iran but ruled with political repression and centralized power. - He balanced buying off elites with limited political opposition and repression of clerics. #### 💬 Quote > He tended to buy people off...if you had a certain amount of power, you were more likely to be bought off than thrown in prison. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson on the Shah's ruling style in Iran. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** So, he spent a long time early in his reign from 41 to probably the mid-60s. First of all, really trying to cozy up to the Americans. He saw the Americans as the superpower that would protect him from the encroachment of the Soviet Union on his northern border. And he was always afraid of communists within Iran. He tried to do something very difficult, which was to be socially and economically progressive. He gave women the right to vote. He went on this very ambitious land reform program, but at the same time became more and more politically in control of the entire country. There was a parliament. It was a rubber stamp. It was really the Shah and his generals who ran the country. But I think it's important to note that the Shah's Iran was never as repressive or as brutal as, say, Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Assad's father and son Syria. He tended to buy people off. So was within Iran, there was a political opposition. Occasionally, some would be arrested. Occasionally, some would be exiled. There was certainly the clerics didn't like him because they saw him secularizing the society. But a lot of them were on sinecures from the state also. So it was a kind of a regime where if you had a certain amount of power, a certain amount of clout, you were more likely to be bought off than thrown in prison. --- ### [Missionary Exposes Khomeini Early](https://share.snipd.com/snip/e44dbdf8-d14b-45a5-849d-ffb71e108ad8) 🎧 08:00 - 10:00 (01:59) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/c12784c9-3d6f-4d4c-8c94-2857b2e36a8e" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - George Braswell, a Christian missionary, taught comparative religion at Tehran University in 1968. - He discovered Khomeini’s revolutionary tapes early, but U.S. officials ignored his warnings. #### 💬 Quote > George Braswell had never heard of Khomeini before...he tried to meet with people at the State Department and they just ignored him. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson talks about missionary George Braswell's early encounter with Khomeini's movement. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** Yes. George Braswell is fascinating. He went to Iran with his family, wife and three kids, in 1968 as an evangelist. And he was the first Southern Baptist evangelist to go back into Iran after about 50 or 60 years. He quickly realized that the government was not going to let him proselytize. And he was really kind of at a loss of what to do until he met the dean of the School of Religion at Tehran University. And the dean hired him on to teach comparative religion at the University of Tehran. Everybody else on the faculty of religion were Muslim. George was the only Christian, but he's a very friendly guy, very affable, very curious about Iranian society. So people really opened up to him. And in particular, after he'd been there for a while, one of his graduate students said, you know, would you like to seek a special kind of service? And George didn't know what that meant. But he said, well, sure, yeah. I'm fascinated by Islam. So the graduate student took him in the middle of the night to this hut out in the southern suburbs. And it was all these younger clerics, mullahs, gathered around a tape cassette player. And they played this tape where the person on the tape was saying, we have to start organizing for the revolution. And that voice was Ayatollah Khomeini from sending the tape in from exile in Iraq. George Braswell had never heard of Khomeini before. This was in 1968. And it would be another about seven years before he would even be mentioned in any State Department cables from Tehran, you know, back to the States. He was utterly invisible to the Americans. Braswell just assumed that the CIA, which had a very large station in Tehran, that they knew all about Khomeini and certainly people at the State Department. --- ### [CIA Ignored Iranian Upheaval](https://share.snipd.com/snip/72acb4bf-7aff-4e68-810c-249850af732c) 🎧 13:34 - 15:30 (01:55) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/196421e2-a311-4126-9b82-bbb03342d9c6" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - The CIA had poor knowledge of internal Iranian unrest despite major riots in Tabriz. - Domestic intelligence was neglected, relying only on pro-Shah secret police reports. #### 💬 Quote > Even though the riots were...he hadn't even heard of it. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson describing CIA ignorance of major civil riots in Iran. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** tell a great story about that. When the first major riots happened, the anti-Shah riots happened, and it was in February of 1978. And it was in a provincial city called Tabriz in northwestern Iran. And there was an American consul there, a man named Mike Matrinko. This was – they gutted the city center. There's a path of destruction about eight miles long and about five miles wide. They just completely gutted the new kind of commercial center of Tabriz, which is a major city. This was such big news, by far the biggest civil disturbance in decades, that even if the regime had tried to downplay it, it impossible. So it was the Tabriz riots, in which probably over 100 people were killed. They were the headlines on every Iranian newspaper for days. It was, of course, the lead story on national news, the television news. And so Matrinko had been the only American there. He reported back what was happening to the embassy. And after about four or five days after the riots, he hears that a CIA officer is coming up to – and wants to meet with him. He's coming up to Debris. And Matrinko's was, wow, great, finally. You know, the CIA has done such a horrible job reporting on this country. But, you know, now finally somebody is coming to take a look on the ground of what's really happening. So the CIA officer arrives, Matrinko picks him up at the airport, and they start driving into the city center. And all of a sudden, the CIA officer kind of sits up and looks out at the destruction and goes, what the hell happened here? He was coming to see Matrinko on a completely different matter. So even though the riots were, he was stationed at the, he was in the CIA station in Tehran. Even though it was a lead story on national news for four or five days, he hadn't even heard of it. --- ### [Whistleblower Ignored at State](https://share.snipd.com/snip/4db7f88d-de3a-458b-9584-a94007cf852c) 🎧 17:09 - 20:02 (02:53) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/6411323d-c685-4ba2-8dc1-d3fddc6c4d6f" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Mike Matrinko warned of the Shah’s regime crumbling and later warned of dangers in Khomeini's Iran. - His warnings were ignored and he was barred from crucial meetings before the embassy hostage crisis. #### 💬 Quote > The meeting has been given a security classification higher than your clearance to attend. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson recounting Mike Matrinko's ignored warnings before the hostage crisis. #### 📚 Transcript **Dave Davies:** The reaction **Scott Anderson:** of his superiors is not only to ignore it but to reprimand him for it. That he is – he's seeing problems where problems don't exist. He's the hysteric out in the provinces and just roundly ignored. Trinko was one of the only people at the embassy who actually spoke Farsi, who could understand what was happening locally. Virtually everybody else did not speak Farsi. So he had a very wide social circle, a very gregarious guy. And so he saw disaster coming long before anybody else. He had served in Iran in the early 70s. He came back in 1977 when the revolution was just starting to kind of perk up a little bit. And this is when he saw people just bailing out of the country, including the wealthy class, and people saying this place is going down the tubes. And when he tried to tell people that, he was completely ignored. Most incredibly with Matrinko, after the revolution, the Khomeini came to power in February of 1979. And so for the next year, nine months, the Carter administration tried to make nice with the Khomeini regime, tried to repair this anti-American feeling. And the people at the embassy were kind of replicating what they had said with the Shah. They said, yeah, everything's going good. You know, they're not really anti-American. They know they have to be allies with us because of all their weaponry is American. And again, Matrinko was the one person who was saying, no, this place is about to blow up. And so in September of 79, this is about six weeks before the American hostages are taken, Matrinko takes a brief home vacation. back to the States and somebody at the State Department hears he's in town and says, look, Mike, you know, I've been reading your reports from the field and they're different from what everybody else is saying. And, you know, you're really painting a very grim picture of what's happening. Will you come in and talk to like the senior policy people in the State Department about what you see? And so Matrinko agrees to do that. They arrange to have a – they take over a conference room on the seventh floor of the State Department the next afternoon. Matrinko arrives a bit early and is going over his notes and a State Department security officer comes into the conference room, kind of taps him on the shoulder and leads him outside and says, yeah, you know, this meeting has been given a security classification higher than your clearance to attend. And Matrinko says, do you realize that this meeting is being held because of what I've been reporting at the field? And the guy says, yeah, it doesn't matter. So the meeting doesn't take place. --- ### [Yazdi's Influence on Khomeini's Image](https://share.snipd.com/snip/7a9e41c8-cbf9-4dbd-b275-334c68bf4600) 🎧 22:20 - 24:10 (01:50) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/1ef6c5c9-37d4-4b04-9e66-b22c298a5212" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Ebrahim Yazdi molded Khomeini's image to reassure the U.S. he was anti-communist and not a threat. - The U.S. began distancing itself from the Shah, viewing Khomeini as a lesser evil. #### 💬 Quote > By about November of 79...the Americans were kind of already distancing themselves from [the Shah]...Khomeini wasn't going to be the worst thing. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson explaining how Yazdi moderated Khomeini's image to Western audiences. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** surprised me when I started looking at this story was how much of the focus of even the Carter administration was still on the Cold War, was still about the Soviet Union. And so the mindset of the Cold War was that everything was a zero-sum game. If we lose, then the Soviets win and vice versa. So at first, when the revolution started, of course, the Americans were kind of panicking. But what Yazdi managed to figure out was what their biggest fear wasn't losing the Shah, but was losing Iran to the Soviets. And of course, that was kind of absurd when you look at Khomeini because he was a rabid anti-communist. At the same time, he kind of moderated Khomeini's speeches and what he would say in press conferences. Well, first of all, he was instrumental in moving Khomeini from Iraq to Paris in October of 78. So all of a sudden, Khomeini is available to the entire world's media. And again, because very few journalists speak Farsi, Yazdi was acting as his interpreter, and he would modify and moderate what Khomeini was saying to make him sound like more reasonable. At the same time this was going on, Yazdi was sending out the message that you have nothing to fear about a communist takeover if Khomeini comes to power. It's anathema to Khomeini communism. So what you start seeing about October, November within the Carter administration is, of course, they want the Shah to stay on. But all of a sudden, they're looking at Khomeini and going, well, you know, if he comes in, that's not the worst thing. The worst thing be if the Reds take over. And really by about November of 79, about two months before the Shah went into exile, the Americans were kind of already distancing themselves from him because it wasn't, you know, **Dave Davies:** Khomeini --- ### [Ignorance of Khomeini Sermons](https://share.snipd.com/snip/0d32731a-b08e-4a7b-a42a-e41f348ac92d) 🎧 25:43 - 26:17 (00:34) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/b5b102ee-1d4d-4a9c-9338-b62b56fdc7ae" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - The U.S. had many unrevealed tapes of Khomeini's incendiary sermons but never listened. - This failure deprived decision-makers of critical insight into Khomeini’s true intentions. #### 💬 Quote > Nobody had listened to them...It was a roadmap to what Khomeini was going to do if he took over. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson on unrevealed Khomeini cassette sermons collected by the U.S. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** right. That's right. When the embassy was taken over by the hostage takers in November of 79, they were rifling all through the embassy safes and file cabinets looking for incriminating information. And they just found stacks and stacks and stacks of cassettes of Khomeini sermons. They had been collected both by the CIA and by the State Department. Nobody had listened to them. Nobody who spoke Farsi had listened to them. Nobody transcribed them. So you're absolutely right. It was a roadmap to what Khomeini was going to do if he took over. --- ### [Futile Dual-Track US Policy](https://share.snipd.com/snip/6ff03c31-1792-48e9-b8f3-dc044b849ebc) 🎧 26:53 - 28:50 (01:56) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/125afb11-aabd-4e25-bf2d-eee640ea74a5" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - The U.S. pursued a confused dual strategy of supporting the Shah while courting Khomeini. - Iranian generals were disorganized, paranoid, and incapable of staging a coup, dooming pro-Shah efforts. #### 💬 Quote > These guys couldn't maneuver their way through a grocery checkout line, let alone stage a coup. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson on U.S. diplomatic confusion and weak Iranian generals in 1979. #### 📚 Transcript **Dave Davies:** This is quite something. So what were these two approaches carried out by different people? So one **Scott Anderson:** idea was that we should continue to support the Shah or at least his caretaker regime behind it. And then the second was to make overtures to Khomeini and the people around him. Where it really became quite bizarre was in the very last days when the Shah was there, they an American general to Iran to meet with the Shah's generals. And at this point, the Shah's generals were about, they wanted to bail out of the country, you know, right along with the Shah. This general convinced them to stay, but they had this very complicated- The American general **Dave Davies:** convinced them to sorry, the American general, yeah, **Scott Anderson:** convinced them to stay. But they had this very complicated, you know, program that they were supposed to follow. Number one, they were supposed to stay loyal to the interim government, the caretaker government that the Shah was leaving behind. And two, if that proved impossible, they were to stage a military coup. The military was supposed to take over. The problem was that you were dealing with a group of generals who had never worked with each other. The general worked with four generals and one admiral in the Iranian armed forces. Those were the five who were supposed to be in control of everything. Some of those men had never met each other because the Shah was so paranoid of losing power that he met with his generals individually. He never met with them as a group. He didn't want one to know the other. And so he would send different, you know, messages, different orders to different people. So these generals had spent a whole career, their careers, just following orders and not having an original thought of their own. So the idea that these men were going to somehow organize a coup, you know, Mike Matrinko famously said, you know, he knew a lot of these generals. He said, these guys couldn't maneuver their way through a grocery checkout line, you know, let alone stage a coup. --- ### [Allowing Shah Into U.S. Triggered Crisis](https://share.snipd.com/snip/5f7ffa87-1285-4b35-86dc-7a6cea933857) 🎧 31:23 - 33:16 (01:53) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/729d6da1-04df-485e-a8e5-1908ffb80af7" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Carter allowed the ailing Shah to enter the U.S., triggering the embassy hostage crisis. - Carter anticipated the crisis but lacked power to stop it, ignoring embassy warnings. #### 💬 Quote > What are you guys going to tell me to do when they attack our embassy and take our people there hostage? Nobody said a thing. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson describing Carter’s decision to admit the Shah and foreseeing the hostage crisis. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** Right. Yeah. And there's another little detail to this that I think is really remarkable. So in the run-up to the hostages being taken, what really precipitated the catalyst for the hostages being taken was when the Carter administration allowed the Shah to come to the United States for medical treatment. And he'd been trying to get into the States for months and months, ever since he'd gone into exile. David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger were lobbying on his behalf and telling Carter, you have to do this. It's a matter of national honor. Then all of a sudden, the Shah becomes deathly ill and doctors around him saying, oh, he can only be treated in the United States. And the Carter administration's first reaction is, you know, what convenient timing. You know, he's been trying to get here forever. And now all of a sudden he has a life or death thing. But it looked like he was very seriously ill. And famously, in late October, Carter convened all his closest foreign policy advisors in the Oval Office, Vice President Mondale, National Security Advisor, Secretary of State. And as Carter often did, he went around the room and asked each person in the room what they should do. Should they let the Shah in? And everybody in the room said, yeah, we have to let him in. It's a matter of national honor. We have to stand by a former ally. And Carter looked at him and said, what are you guys going to tell me to do when they attack our embassy and take our people there hostage? And nobody said a thing. And then Carter said, yeah, that's what I thought you were going to say. So he saw it coming and it was just kind **Dave Davies:** of powerless to stop it. That is quite a moment. And I think the officials at the embassy in Tehran had warned them, look, if you let the Shah into the country, they're going to send us back in boxes. **Scott Anderson:** That's right. They warned him again and again. And Carter had listened to them up until October of 79. --- ### [Revolution Strengthened Extremism](https://share.snipd.com/snip/86795cb2-0b6b-48a9-8b54-afda07133579) 🎧 33:33 - 35:10 (01:36) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/e3020121-a62a-4b03-a5a2-6fed637a579d" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - The Iranian revolution empowered extremist groups like Hezbollah, increasing Iran’s regional influence. - U.S. missteps enabled Iran’s rise as a dominant regional actor, overshadowing American influence. #### 💬 Quote > If you look at what was happening in the Middle East...you would have to say that the Iranians had far more influence than the Americans had. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson on the Iranian revolution’s long-term regional consequences. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** one and what's the connection? So, I mean, starting kind of right off the bat, with the Khomeini regime, they immediately started to militarize their allies throughout the region, famously Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon. So when Lebanon blew up again in 82, 83, it was Hezbollah units that blew up the American embassy and then blew up the American marine compound in 1983, started taking Americans hostage. And then going forward from that, I mean, if you look at the invasion of Iraq, who benefited from that were the Iranians, because in the power vacuum that that created, they now have enormous influence over, certainly over southern Iraq, which is the Shiite heartland. And throughout the region, these groups that have been kind of squashed in the last year or so by the Israelis, these were all the regime's kind of mischief makers out in the region. And I mean, ISIS was Sunni, but by Iran's supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria, an absolutely murderous regime. If you look at what was happening in the Middle East four, five, six years ago, you would have to say that the Iranians had far more influence than the Americans had. They were – the Americans had – as their want to do, they had involved themselves in a region. I come in. They were going to be the peacekeepers. They had the liberators. And then things went south and jumped out. And that has only --- ### [Shah’s Dual Failures Accelerated Fall](https://share.snipd.com/snip/3664a302-9c3f-44f0-98ca-86b1ea7dcebe) 🎧 35:40 - 37:07 (01:27) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/c8fb7da4-e6a1-452f-bf4d-103bb9b86a83" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - The Shah’s indecisiveness and contradictory actions hastened his downfall. - Neither brutal repression nor genuine reform was fully pursued, dooming his regime. #### 💬 Quote > He did both simultaneously...He declares martial law but tells the generals only under the most dire circumstances are soldiers to fire live ammunition. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson analyzing Shah’s failed balancing act during revolutionary unrest. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** I think that's true. I think that people always say he would be hard for a while. Then he'd go soft and back and forth. He'd oscillate. But in fact, he did even worse than that. He did both simultaneously. So he declares martial law, but then tells the generals that, you know, only under the most dire circumstances are soldiers to fire live ammunition. So he kind of tries to do both things at the same time. I think if the Shah had – if he had taken a Saddam Hussein or an Assad approach, if he had just machine gunned his people in the streets, he might have lasted a bit longer. Conversely, if I think that there was a time when if he had pushed for reform and agreed to lose a lot of his power and to have more of a parliamentary democracy where he had very limited power, I think he might have survived. But I think by trying to do both at the same time, it was kind of impossible. And, you know, it's curious now, now his son, Crown Prince Reza, amidst the disturbance or the bombings lately, you know, he's gone around to the media and kind of presented himself as the alternative. And there's this royalist resurgence in restoring the monarchy. And I just find it a bit laughable. 80% of Iranians now have been born after the revolution. So there's very little memory of the Shah's time. What memory there is, is probably quite hostile under the education system of the Islamic Republic. --- ### [Regime Survives By Controlled Openness](https://share.snipd.com/snip/f64469fe-22a4-41a0-8e75-e8658da9fd8c) 🎧 37:27 - 39:09 (01:42) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/e351876d-34e4-41a4-9ee8-47696c608707" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Israeli-American bombings temporarily rallied support around Iran’s regime. - The regime allows some freedoms and honest elections to avoid total collapse. #### 💬 Quote > The bombings gave the regime just a new lease on life...They've been quite clever in giving people just enough so that things don't blow up. > — Scott Anderson Scott Anderson on dynamics preserving the Islamic Republic amid unrest. #### 📚 Transcript **Scott Anderson:** You know, that's a great question. And I actually sensed the Israeli-American bombing of Iran. I've talked to several of people I know in Iran. Most of them, frankly, are not fans of the regime. But what they've all said is that the bombings gave the regime just a new lease on life. It's produced this rallying around the flag effect inside Iran. You know, as a general rule, people don't like being bombed by foreign armies. And they feel the idea of this regime getting toppled or reformed in a significant way have just been pushed off a lot by the actions of the Israelis and the Americans at this point. I think something else to keep in mind about Iran. Yes, it's a brutal regime. It's a repressive regime. But there's certain openings in it. There's an element of freedom. There's elections. And sometimes elections are honest. You're allowed a certain degree of dissent. Not all women now you know, wear veils. And I think they've been quite clever in giving people just enough so that things don't blow up. It kind of reminds me of, say, you know, late-day Soviet Union or late-day East Germany, that certainly they weren't as repressive as they had been 20 years before. But, again, it's the question of when you start opening the lid a little bit, how can you control it? How do you keep the lid just slightly ajar and keep it from coming off completely? But I think thus far one of the reasons the regime is very selective of who they crush and they do allow sort of a degree of freedom that creates a hope that maybe some more will come. --- Created with [Snipd](https://www.snipd.com) | Highlight & Take Notes from Podcasts