# Making the Most of Your Mistakes  ## Episode metadata - Episode title: Making the Most of Your Mistakes - Show: Hidden Brain - Owner / Host: Hidden Brain, Shankar Vedantam - Guests: [John Dinsmore](https://share.snipd.com/person/6ae5994d-69a8-4264-9e13-ef04dbd821f5), [Amy Edmondson](https://share.snipd.com/person/b39c5b41-77b4-4d1e-a73b-828f9fccdacc) - Episode publish date: 2026-08-03 - Episode AI description: Amy Edmondson, Harvard professor who studies teamwork and the science of failure, and John Dinsmore, researcher of money and debt, join to explore mistakes and money. They contrast constructive, small-scale failures that teach with systemic failures that cause harm. They also dig into how optimism, hidden fees, and family habits shape financial risk-taking. - Mentioned books: [Right Kind of Wrong](https://share.snipd.com/book/7e84fc24-e621-4c89-bc85-5bf3c0bdc034) by [Amy Edmondson](https://share.snipd.com/person/b39c5b41-77b4-4d1e-a73b-828f9fccdacc) - Duration: 01:25:37 - Episode URL: [Open in Snipd](https://share.snipd.com/episode/642c950b-3d0c-4347-b258-52f263defebc) - Show URL: [Open in Snipd](https://share.snipd.com/show/c94a26f6-1a03-4020-a574-bec10c59f432) - Export date: 2026-08-12T18:56:39 ## Snips ### [When A Government Typo Destroyed A Company](https://share.snipd.com/snip/720e47b1-8da5-4397-b362-ae280e2a7cde) 🎧 00:00 - 01:44 (01:44) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/76dbfc1d-e072-4344-94a9-76422c15b986" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - A single typo at Companies House falsely announced Philip Davison Sebery's firm in liquidation and triggered canceled orders and creditor demands. - That bureaucratic error set off a debt spiral that ultimately sank the 134-year-old Taylor & Sons business. #### 💬 Quote > Your company is in liquidation. > — Shankar Vedantam Introduction story about Taylor & Sons #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** This is Hidden Brain. I'm Shankar Vedantam. In 2009, British businessman Philip Davison Sebery was celebrating his wife's 50th birthday in the Maldives when he got a phone call. The caller asked for a business meeting the next day at 8 a.m. Philip explained that that would be a little difficult, seeing as he was 4,500 miles away from work on vacation. What are you doing away at a time like this? The voice at the other end of the line shouted. Your company is in liquidation. Philip thought it was a joke in poor taste. In an interview with Wales Online, he that the caller assured him that it was no joking matter. Here's what happened. A British government agency had reported the demise of Philip's 134-year engineering company, Taylor& Sons. The government agency, known as Companies House, serves as a kind of registrar for British businesses. It said that Taylor& Sons, created in 1875, was being shut down. Turns out, a government clerk had made a typo. The company that was going out of business was Taylor& Sons in Manchester, not Taylor& Sons in Wales. Philip felt sick. His company had been doing well. It had some 250 employees. Within days, he later said in that interview with Wales Online, his contracts dried up. Orders were cancelled. Creditors demanded to be paid. The government agency did correct the mistake after some days, but a debt spiral had taken hold. --- ### [Reporting Signals True Safety Climate](https://share.snipd.com/snip/8131c11f-a7b2-4cab-8daf-84fa3da583a0) 🎧 04:10 - 11:48 (07:38) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/e4680f08-6a4c-4108-a5ce-87d75011e29d" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Amy Edmondson found teams with better interpersonal climates reported more errors because people felt safe to speak up, not because they made more mistakes. - A single survey item—'If you make a mistake in this unit, it's held against you'—strongly predicted reported error rates. #### 💬 Quote > If you make a mistake in this unit, it's held against you. > — Amy Edmondson On the survey item that correlated with higher reported error rates #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** To err is human. When people work on things, mistakes are inevitable. This is true in our personal lives, in our workplaces, and at the level of public policy. Not all mistakes are created equal, though. Some failures are trivial, while others can be disastrous. At Harvard Business School, Amy Edmondson studies how failures come about and what we can do about them. has surprising insights into how organizations and people should think about the mistakes they make. Amy Edmondson, welcome to Hidden Brain. Thank you so much for having me. Amy, as a young scientist working on your first major research project, you spent months collecting data from doctors and nurses at two local hospitals. The stakes here were high. I understand that you were tracking **Amy Edmondson:** medical mistakes? Yes, we call them adverse drug events. So that is when something bad happens to a patient that is deemed caused by human error. And so I would get a phone call from one of the physicians in the study who would say, there's just been an event. And so we're going to take a look at what happened. And so I would hop on my bike and ride down to the hospital and I'd find myself in a conference room. And we would then sit around and hear from the perspective of different people who may have touched or been aware of the adverse event and we try to truly understand what happened. So for instance, in one case, there was a patient that received a drug called lidocaine and they were supposed to get a drug called heparin. Now the two drugs were labeled similarly and they were in the same location even though they do very different things. Now, in this case, the lidocaine would not hurt the patient, but the absence of heparin might have led to real harm. It didn't. So these adverse events didn't always involve harm, but they always involved at least the potential for harm. **Shankar Vedantam:** Now, you became aware that some teams at these hospitals were making more errors, more mistakes than others. But besides tracking mistakes, you also were examining how teams functioned, and you found that some teams functioned better **Amy Edmondson:** than others. Tell me about the components of teamwork that you measured. Well, I used a team survey called the Team Diagnostic Survey, and it measured such things as the quality of interpersonal relationships in the team, the team's own self-assessment of how well they were performing, the team's assessment of whether and the degree to which they had the resources they need to do their job well, especially interested in their assessment of the leadership of the team and how good was that leadership. And these are a set of factors that had been previously recognized as important to team effectiveness. And **Shankar Vedantam:** you were also looking at how much people cared about their work and whether people felt like everyone was pulling their fair **Amy Edmondson:** share of the weight. Yes. And I think that assessment is partly captured in the quality of relationships measure, but there also was the measures of their satisfaction with the work, how happy they were in their job. And all of these measures tend to travel together. So in a good team, in a well-led team, they tend to be high on all of these factors. In a not good team, they're low on all of these factors. So you now have two sets of data, information on **Shankar Vedantam:** high-performing teams versus low-performing teams, and information on teams that make few mistakes or lots of mistakes. I mean, it seems quite obvious what the answer is going to be, but what was your intuition about how the quality of teams would relate to the mistakes that teams were making? Well, **Amy Edmondson:** my intuition was that better teamwork would lead to fewer mistakes or adverse events for patients. This just makes sense. And the more I understood about the nature of patient care in a hospital, the more I realized how interdependent it was. First of all, it's 24-7 operations. So there's shift handoffs. And second of all, most patients are seen by multiple different caregivers through the course of their stay. And so the quality of the coordination and the collaboration ought to really determine the degree to which high quality care is given. So of course I expected better teams would have fewer adverse events or mistakes. So the day comes when you're ready to analyze **Shankar Vedantam:** all of the data. You have a small computer disk with all the medication errors made by each team. Paint me a picture of what happened that day, Amy. **Amy Edmondson:** Well, I synced up the data on the disk with the data that I already had on the team properties in my computer and started to run the statistical analysis to connect those two data sources. And I just ran some simple correlations and I saw right away that the p-value, which indicates, you know, whether or not the finding is statistically significant, I saw that the p-value indicated that my data were statistically significant. So I was very excited. And then I looked more closely, leaning into the screen, and I realized that the sign was in the wrong direction. In other words, instead of seeing a relationship between good teamwork and low error rates, the statistical significance was saying there was a relationship between good teamwork and high error rates. How could that possibly be, Amy? Well, that was my question. And I sat there, I think I froze. I was upset and I was scared. And so I sat there looking at it and my first reaction was, I must have made a mistake. I must have put the data in incorrectly. So I walked very carefully through everything I'd done. I redid it. And nope, maybe my hypothesis had been a mistake, but I had not made a kind of data entry mistake. And so there I was staring at it again and again, puzzled. This just can't be true, right? can't be that better teams with higher quality relationships, more able and willing to collaborate effectively, to coordinate clearly, could have more, not fewer adverse drug events. And I suddenly had a thought, you know, maybe better teams don't make more mistakes. Maybe they're more able and willing to report them. And I suddenly remembered that I had inserted an extra question that wasn't in the original survey that is stated as follows. If you make a mistake in this unit, it's held against you and it's rated on a seven scale from, you know, not at all to a great deal. And it turned out that that single item was profoundly significantly correlated with the actual error rates. So that meant that when people agreed with this item, making a mistake would not be held against you, the error rates were higher. That's --- ### [Hospitals Where Mistakes Are Punished Versus Welcomed](https://share.snipd.com/snip/e61bd06d-0a69-4e09-83e1-71593dd30b99) 🎧 12:21 - 13:39 (01:17) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/1cd325c0-33a6-4f20-9596-9edad1784b66" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - A field observer described some hospital units as 'authoritarian' where staff said mistakes lead to being 'put on trial.' - Other nearby units said it's easy to talk about mistakes because patient safety is at stake and managers are receptive. #### 💬 Quote > If you make a mistake in this unit, you get treated like a two-year or you get put on trial. > — Amy Edmondson Research assistant's observations about unit climates #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** Well, **Amy Edmondson:** first of all, I think it's important to point out that I did not tell him what the survey data said, nor what the error data said. He only knew that there was a study of error going on. And I said, I just want your impression of what it's like to work in these units. I want you to observe them. I want you to interview them when they're on breaks and just, you know, learn as much as you can about these different work environments. And off he went. And after a week or so, he came back. He said, you know, they really are very different places to work. Some of them, he said, his words were just far more open. And others, he said, again, his words were authoritarian in nature. In some units, people would say things like, if you make a mistake in this unit, you get treated like a two-year or you get put on trial. So you really don't want to have made one. Or the manager, who is essentially the boss of the unit, if a nurse, would get angry and treat you badly. In other units, even though they're only maybe across the hall or up a floor or two, he found people saying things like, well, in this unit, it's really easy to talk about mistakes because of what's at stake. know, patients' health is at stake. --- ### [Zero Error Demands Hide Problems](https://share.snipd.com/snip/0b23ac9e-9eef-4a6a-9bfa-bbabbad4dd9b) 🎧 17:58 - 18:31 (00:32) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/5366b580-f266-42b6-9896-77fbc6f3a619" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Insisting on zero errors often silences reporting rather than eliminating mistakes, so leaders lose visibility into real risks. - Edmondson argues learning requires honest reporting; otherwise failures persist unseen. #### 💬 Quote > When you insist that we must have... error-free performance... the main thing that happens is not that error goes away. It's that you stop hearing about it. > — Amy Edmondson On consequences of demanding no errors #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** that you were **Amy Edmondson:** mentioning **Shankar Vedantam:** to me earlier, when you send a signal that failure is not going to be tolerated, what happens then is not that the failure stop, but that the failure stop being reported. Exactly. **Amy Edmondson:** It's one of these profound insights that I think way too few leaders or even just people in families recognize that when you insist that we must have, you know, error-free performance or error-free lives, the main thing that happens is not that error goes away. --- ### [Match Failure Strategy To Context](https://share.snipd.com/snip/1d7ae35a-0679-429c-8559-93aac87a65b5) 🎧 18:44 - 19:21 (00:36) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/a5b0c18a-c048-4a00-afff-6f3228336953" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Use 'fail fast' in R&D and experimentation but preserve high reliability practices in operations with catastrophic risk. - Match your failure posture to context: exploratory labs versus operating theaters or airlines. #### 💬 Quote > The fail fast, fail often is a fantastic approach for a laboratory or for an R&D group. > — Amy Edmondson On when 'fail fast' makes sense #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** And this was to celebrate failure. Fail fast, fail early was the motto. Was this a better approach than leaders telling employees that failure was unacceptable? I **Amy Edmondson:** don't think it's possible to say one is better than the other. They are better for different contexts. So the fail fast, fail often is a fantastic approach for a laboratory or for an R&D group. The, you know, let's adhere to the highest possible standards and try our very best to get everything right is how we want to run an operating theater. --- ### [What Makes A Failure Intelligent](https://share.snipd.com/snip/2cadda69-a33f-4105-ba27-8c2102bade85) 🎧 19:59 - 20:50 (00:51) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/6a1ec664-6abf-4836-8dfa-2649f07dbd97" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Intelligent failures are small, hypothesis-driven experiments at the frontier of knowledge that produce useful information when they fail. - They differ from careless risks because they reduce scale and are designed to teach quickly. #### 💬 Quote > [Intelligent failures] are the undesired results of forays into new territory that are driven by a hypothesis and are as small as possible. > — Amy Edmondson Defining intelligent failures citing Sim Sitkin #### 📚 Transcript **Amy Edmondson:** are the undesired results of forays into new territory that are driven by a hypothesis and are as small as possible. And so in a sense, an intelligent failure is an experiment that didn't produce the result you had truly wanted it to produce. In **Shankar Vedantam:** some ways, what that implies then is that intelligent failures are almost always failures that take place on the frontiers of knowledge or discovery. **Amy Edmondson:** Yes. So there's two kinds of frontiers. One is the frontier of knowledge or discovery in that we're talking about a place where no one has been before. And the other is the frontier that's just new for you. Let's say you pick up a new hobby. You decide to take a ceramics class. That's new territory for you. --- ### [Columbia Foam Strike Was Dismissed As Routine](https://share.snipd.com/snip/839fbc30-b94d-4c6f-adb6-a87b1daf86f2) 🎧 21:31 - 22:56 (01:24) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/2e625dd0-8f21-4c4d-9759-f6bd4747c8f5" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - A large foam chunk struck Columbia's wing, creating a hole the size of a human head that led to catastrophic re-entry combustion. - Engineers saw a speck on launch video but senior managers dismissed foam strikes as routine maintenance. #### 💬 Quote > The very fact that he could see a speck at all suggested to him that the chunk... might be big enough to do real damage. > — Amy Edmondson On Rodney Rocha noticing a possible foam strike before Columbia disaster #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** In 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart upon re-entry into Earth's atmosphere, killing the seven astronauts aboard. You conducted an in-depth analysis of what happened to the Columbia when it broke apart, and it was something that you ended up calling a complex failure. Tell me the story of what happened, Amy. Well, **Amy Edmondson:** the shuttle had completely combusted on re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere on February 1st, 2003. And it was later determined that the reason for that is something called a foam strike. Now, what happens is to get the shuttle out beyond the Earth's atmosphere, it takes off with the help of a solid rocket booster. And that has that sort of has the energy to bring it out into space. And that is is surrounded by insulating foam. And occasionally little bits of that insulating foam would break off just because of the pressure of the launch. And sometimes those little bits strike the shuttle and make little dents, you just little nuisance problems that would lead to maintenance later on to fix them up. But in this case, there was a rather large piece of foam that dislodged and hit the shuttle on a delicate spot, the leading edge of the wing. And so it unfortunately made a larger hole, a hole the size of a human head. --- ### [Swiss Cheese Explains Complex Failures](https://share.snipd.com/snip/c4b2b7f0-55c3-4d1a-af17-22b7224505e4) 🎧 26:21 - 27:08 (00:46) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/398bbe09-ca0b-46c4-ac91-47899deff10c" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Complex failures arise when many small defects align like holes in Swiss cheese to create a tunnel to disaster. - Stopping any single contributing factor early often prevents the catastrophic alignment. #### 💬 Quote > When your cheese has air bubbles in it... they're not problematic until they line up and make a tunnel. > — Amy Edmondson Explaining James Reason's Swiss cheese model #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** I understand that in the healthcare arena, these kinds of complex failures are sometimes called the Swiss cheese model of failure. Explain that term for me, Amy, and explain how you use this analogy to analyze a case in which a young patient received a dangerous overdose of morphine. That's **Amy Edmondson:** right. And the Swiss cheese metaphor comes from an error theorist named James Reason from the UK. And he uses this metaphor of Swiss cheese to try to explain the of complex failures. He says, you know, when your cheese has air bubbles in it, those are in a sense defects in the cheese, but they're not problematic until they line up and make a tunnel. Just rarely happens, but when it happens, then the error goes all the way through. --- ### [Stop The Line When Something Seems Off](https://share.snipd.com/snip/a0d9e32e-ed1f-4fbf-9b9c-4abef11f1207) 🎧 30:12 - 31:13 (01:00) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/bed3af65-508b-4966-ab1e-0611597db407" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Empower frontline workers to halt a process when they spot anomalies, and rapidly diagnose rather than punish. - Toyota's Andon cord brings a leader to the line to fix or confirm issues; one in 12 pulls reveals real problems. #### 💬 Quote > When you pull the cord... a team leader comes quickly over and says, what do you see? > — Amy Edmondson Describing Toyota's Andon cord practice #### 📚 Transcript **Amy Edmondson:** Toyota is one of the best examples of doing this well. And probably the best practice that is maybe even the most famous of the Toyota production system is something called the Andon cord. And that is a literal cord that any team member is encouraged to pull whenever they see something wrong, or even more importantly, whenever they see something that might be wrong. Now, many people think once you pull the cord, the line instantly stops. It doesn't. When you pull the cord, what happens is that a team leader comes quickly over and says, what do you see? And you explain. And the two of you together diagnose what's happening. And most of the time, it turns out that you can either fix it or recognize that there wasn't a real problem and the line keeps going. But one out of 12 times, there is a real problem there. The line will stop, and it won't start again until that problem is fixed. --- ### [Expert Sailor Overboard From Momentary Inattention](https://share.snipd.com/snip/060456e1-33a9-4e96-b7eb-370a7e2a52d5) 🎧 32:34 - 34:28 (01:54) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/72f1908e-8201-4658-a765-5a621e88003f" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Amy Edmondson was knocked overboard during a regatta because she relaxed while dead downwind and the boom swung across, causing head injuries and nine stitches. - She labels this a basic failure: routine inattention while operating dangerous equipment. #### 💬 Quote > It was a small moment of inattention, looking away, not paying attention, just being overly casual... > — Amy Edmondson Her recount of getting knocked overboard and injured #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** Tell me what happened, Amy. Well, I had signed up for an alumni regatta **Amy Edmondson:** at Harvard. And when I got there, I realized kind of to my horror that everybody else there was about two years out of school, not several decades as I was, but that was okay. I can do it. I'm a good sailor. I'll do the best I can. So off I went and I was thrilled to not come in dead last in the first race. After the second race, there was a break where all the boats go back to the dock before the continues. The dock was dead downwind, which means that if you're in a sailboat, the boom on the sailboat holding up the sail is as far out as it can possibly go. And if you're dead downwind and the wind shifts even just a little bit, the boom is at risk of flying over to the other side. So any experienced sailor, and I am an experienced sailor, knows that. So we all know that when you're heading dead downwind, you had better be vigilant because you are at risk. Now in the Charles River where this regatta was, the wind is notoriously shifty. But the race was over. We're just heading into the shore. So I'm chatting with my crew, a little bit relaxed. And all of a sudden, the boom flies across the boat with a little wind shift, knocks me out. Next thing you know, I'm in a freezing cold Charles River. God, you got knocked overboard. I got knocked overboard. It's early May. The water is probably 40 degrees. Fortunately, my crew, who's a fantastic sailor, quickly turns the boat around to come get me. I climb in the back, the stern of the boat, and then I just see it, all the blood everywhere in the hull that's coming out of my head. So it led to nine stitches in the side of my head. --- ### [Use Checklists Consciously Not By Habit](https://share.snipd.com/snip/c030f00d-c97c-4b41-8cf1-48cd7de6efeb) 🎧 35:09 - 36:12 (01:02) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/fa032f0b-c20a-4b90-9c73-3f1de07441de" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Use checklists mindfully and confirm critical items aloud rather than skip ahead by habit. - Air Florida crashed after the captain habitually skipped 'anti-ice' and the first officer moved on, showing checklist rituals can fail if rote. #### 💬 Quote > When the first officer said... anti-ice, the captain said habitually off. > — Amy Edmondson On Air Florida Flight 90 crash and checklist failure #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** We've actually talked about the power of checklists on an earlier episode of Hidden Brain. You've pointed out, Amy, that sort of just having a checklist is not enough. You actually have to do it mindfully. And you described the story of an airline crash that took place some years ago. Tell me the story of what happened. **Amy Edmondson:** So it was a freezing cold January morning in Washington, D.C., and Air Florida Flight 90 was headed for Fort Lauderdale, back home, I guess, and unfortunately they crashed into the Potomac River. Why did that happen? Well, it turns out, yes, they used the checklist. And most of our listeners are probably aware that the checklist includes the item anti-ice. When the first officer said, as part of the checklist, anti-ice, the captain said habitually off. It's Air Florida. I think most of their flights would not be using the anti-ice machinery. The first officer went on to the next item on the checklist. --- ### [Set Clear Goals And Do Homework Before Failing](https://share.snipd.com/snip/fc487552-57c2-4f33-b3fa-b9392ff513b6) 🎧 39:55 - 41:22 (01:26) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/38073dbc-6624-4ddf-9b1a-7c0f130ef6f8" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Intelligent failure requires a clear goal and prior homework so each failed experiment narrows the search for a solution efficiently. - Edison reframed failed attempts as discoveries, iterating thousands of times toward a working bulb. #### 💬 Quote > I haven't failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that don't work. > — Amy Edmondson (quoting Thomas Edison) On Edison's approach to repeated experiments #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** Amy, you found that intelligent failures happen in very specific circumstances. The first is that the failure happens in new and uncharted territory. I understand that you spoke to a prominent chemist, Jennifer Heemstra, and like many scientists, she does work on the frontiers of knowledge. I mean, she's trying to discover things that we don't know already. What did she tell you about what failure looks like in her lab? Well, she **Amy Edmondson:** has a wonderful way of leading her very thriving laboratory. She tells her students and young scientists, we're going to fail all day. And she says failure is a part of science. And of course, she's right. And what she means is if we are on the leading edge of our field, and that's where we hope to be, we're going to have some very smart, well-informed hypotheses, but many, if not most of them, in fact, in her view, 90% of them will end in failure. They will have been wrong. But each of those failures is in itself an important discovery. It lets them know what didn't work so that they can then quickly rethink and try the next one and hope that that might work. In **Shankar Vedantam:** some ways, it's like, you know, wandering around in a dark room with your arms outstretched and you're searching for the door. You know, and each sort of stab in the dark, you know, might not give you the door handle, but it tells you where the door handle is not. And eventually, if you make a sufficient number of failures, you're likely **Amy Edmondson:** to eventually find the door handle. --- ### [Optimism Bias Fuels Risky Debt Choices](https://share.snipd.com/snip/0ab2b816-81bb-4616-87fe-0970501806b8) 🎧 55:24 - 56:50 (01:25) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/a8f0f975-0526-44d2-ab5b-7f078888982d" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Optimism bias leads people to overestimate future income or outcomes and underprepare, pushing them into risky debt decisions. - John Dinsmore links this bias to taking on more debt expecting better future circumstances that may not materialize. #### 💬 Quote > When we think of the future, we always tend to think of it in terms of things working out for us. > — John Dinsmore On optimism bias and financial decisions #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** If the risks of failure are small, then it makes a lot of sense to try something new. If the risks are catastrophic, it's wise to be cautious. At Wright State University, John Dinsmore studies how we think about money and debt. Those things shape our ability to take on risk and to explore new ventures. We featured John's research on a recent episode of the show titled The Debt Trap. Many listeners have thoughts, comments, and personal stories about their adventures with money and debt. John is back today to respond to those stories. John Dinsmore, welcome back to Hidden Brain. Thanks for having me. John, one of the things that makes it difficult to accurately judge the risk of doing or not doing something is what scientists call the optimism bias. When it comes to money and debt, how does this bias work? Well, when we think of the **John Dinsmore:** future, we always tend to think of it in terms of things working out for us, us getting the promotion, us making more money in the future than we're making now. And while that is a good perspective to have in terms of perseverance and motivation, things don't always work out that way, right? We all have hiccups along the way. Everyone a story of running into some bad luck. And when we make financial decisions involving projecting --- ### [Check For Drip Pricing Before You Commit](https://share.snipd.com/snip/dd8a2b12-249c-401d-819b-8867370622db) 🎧 59:02 - 01:00:11 (01:08) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/07d5093b-1489-4af4-ba90-da4a60a18947" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Beware drip pricing and layered fees that appear after initial commitment; compare final all-in costs before you buy. - Dinsmore warns of add-ons like seat selection or late fees that accumulate because buyers already committed to the purchase. #### 💬 Quote > Drip pricing is where you encounter a price for a good, and you think that one price represents all that the good is going to cost you. > — John Dinsmore Defining drip pricing and its effect on buyers #### 📚 Transcript **John Dinsmore:** Drip pricing is where you encounter a price for a good, and you think that one price represents all that the good is going to cost you. But as you go through the purchasing price, there are all these little add on costs. A popular example of drip pricing would be airline tickets, right? You get the airfare, you go through the work to figure out, here's the route and the time and the price. And then once you select that flight and start going through the purchasing price, well, then you get hit with, do you want to choose your seat? Do you want to have priority boarding? Do you all of these add on things? But since people have already committed to the initial purchase, they usually absorb these extra prices as they go. Typically, when you're looking at how certain forms of debt, say credit cards are advertised, you usually just see one interest rate up front, the interest rate being the price for the debt. But there are usually lots of kickers, whether it's late fees, or maybe the rate goes up over time. But, you know, we bite into that initial price that we encounter. --- ### [Timeshare Sale Turned $10,000 Loss](https://share.snipd.com/snip/7d64b2a1-635c-407e-87cd-f985edbd9cfd) 🎧 01:00:34 - 01:01:36 (01:01) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/f10e08a3-5b01-4b7c-bb3e-be334bde1046" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Listener Maria bought a timeshare with $10,000 on a credit card after a sales pitch promising three free weeks, but maintenance fees and restricted availability made it worthless. - The sales lure and complex contract trapped her in ongoing monthly costs she couldn't use. #### 💬 Quote > We're normally very smart about our finances, but we got caught up on being vacationed. > — Maria (listener quoted) Listener recounting being persuaded into a timeshare purchase #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** So Maria was on vacation, and on this vacation, she was convinced by marketers to purchase a timeshare. She says that she was enticed into the deal, which involved putting $10,000 down on a credit card after the salesman offered her three free weeks at any of the timeshare properties in their portfolio. **Amy Edmondson:** We're normally very smart about our finances, but we got caught up on being vacationed. by the lure of the three weeks, and then by the opportunity of staying in international locations, and well, it ended up being all lies, everything they said. They just made it impossible. And for all this time, you had to keep the monthly fee. In addition to the credit card that we purchased, the 10,000 was paid on a credit card. We also had to pay a monthly maintenance fee. We never even got to use it. --- ### [Irregular Costs Break Budgets](https://share.snipd.com/snip/c5704a5a-a9cf-4c1e-8ddf-57e2fea77d64) 🎧 01:15:35 - 01:16:40 (01:05) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/050db277-8697-4877-ae5f-07bb5b859daf" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Expense prediction bias makes people good at forecasting regular bills but poor at irregular, unpredictable costs like major home repairs. - John Dinsmore notes homeowners often ignore sporadic but large expenses, leaving budgets vulnerable. #### 💬 Quote > We are pretty poor at predicting our irregular expenses. > — John Dinsmore On expense prediction bias and homeownership risks #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** So **John Dinsmore:** expense prediction bias says that we actually are pretty good at being able to predict our regular expenses, right? So things like our mortgage or heating bill, they happen at the same time every month, and typically for about the same amounts. But we are pretty poor at predicting our irregular expenses. So things like car repairs, home repairs, entertainment expenses, things like that that happen sporadically and at different amounts. So when we think of a budget or we're trying to predict how much things are going to cost us over a given month, we're able to incorporate the regular expenses, but we completely ignore the irregular expenses. If you have ever owned a home, you know that there's always going to be frequent, but irregularly timed, maybe not every month, but one happens three months and then another seven months from then. These significant expenses that you know are going to happen at some point, but you don't know exactly when or for what amount. --- Created with [Snipd](https://www.snipd.com) | Highlight & Take Notes from Podcasts # Snips updated after 2026-08-12T15:56:21 ### [When A Government Typo Destroyed A Company](https://share.snipd.com/snip/720e47b1-8da5-4397-b362-ae280e2a7cde) 🎧 00:00 - 01:44 (01:44) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/76dbfc1d-e072-4344-94a9-76422c15b986" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - A single typo at Companies House falsely announced Philip Davison Sebery's firm in liquidation and triggered canceled orders and creditor demands. - That bureaucratic error set off a debt spiral that ultimately sank the 134-year-old Taylor & Sons business. #### 💬 Quote > Your company is in liquidation. > — Shankar Vedantam Introduction story about Taylor & Sons #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** This is Hidden Brain. I'm Shankar Vedantam. In 2009, British businessman Philip Davison Sebery was celebrating his wife's 50th birthday in the Maldives when he got a phone call. The caller asked for a business meeting the next day at 8 a.m. Philip explained that that would be a little difficult, seeing as he was 4,500 miles away from work on vacation. What are you doing away at a time like this? The voice at the other end of the line shouted. Your company is in liquidation. Philip thought it was a joke in poor taste. In an interview with Wales Online, he that the caller assured him that it was no joking matter. Here's what happened. A British government agency had reported the demise of Philip's 134-year engineering company, Taylor& Sons. The government agency, known as Companies House, serves as a kind of registrar for British businesses. It said that Taylor& Sons, created in 1875, was being shut down. Turns out, a government clerk had made a typo. The company that was going out of business was Taylor& Sons in Manchester, not Taylor& Sons in Wales. Philip felt sick. His company had been doing well. It had some 250 employees. Within days, he later said in that interview with Wales Online, his contracts dried up. Orders were cancelled. Creditors demanded to be paid. The government agency did correct the mistake after some days, but a debt spiral had taken hold. --- ### [Reporting Signals True Safety Climate](https://share.snipd.com/snip/8131c11f-a7b2-4cab-8daf-84fa3da583a0) 🎧 04:10 - 11:48 (07:38) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/e4680f08-6a4c-4108-a5ce-87d75011e29d" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Amy Edmondson found teams with better interpersonal climates reported more errors because people felt safe to speak up, not because they made more mistakes. - A single survey item—'If you make a mistake in this unit, it's held against you'—strongly predicted reported error rates. #### 💬 Quote > If you make a mistake in this unit, it's held against you. > — Amy Edmondson On the survey item that correlated with higher reported error rates #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** To err is human. When people work on things, mistakes are inevitable. This is true in our personal lives, in our workplaces, and at the level of public policy. Not all mistakes are created equal, though. Some failures are trivial, while others can be disastrous. At Harvard Business School, Amy Edmondson studies how failures come about and what we can do about them. has surprising insights into how organizations and people should think about the mistakes they make. Amy Edmondson, welcome to Hidden Brain. Thank you so much for having me. Amy, as a young scientist working on your first major research project, you spent months collecting data from doctors and nurses at two local hospitals. The stakes here were high. I understand that you were tracking **Amy Edmondson:** medical mistakes? Yes, we call them adverse drug events. So that is when something bad happens to a patient that is deemed caused by human error. And so I would get a phone call from one of the physicians in the study who would say, there's just been an event. And so we're going to take a look at what happened. And so I would hop on my bike and ride down to the hospital and I'd find myself in a conference room. And we would then sit around and hear from the perspective of different people who may have touched or been aware of the adverse event and we try to truly understand what happened. So for instance, in one case, there was a patient that received a drug called lidocaine and they were supposed to get a drug called heparin. Now the two drugs were labeled similarly and they were in the same location even though they do very different things. Now, in this case, the lidocaine would not hurt the patient, but the absence of heparin might have led to real harm. It didn't. So these adverse events didn't always involve harm, but they always involved at least the potential for harm. **Shankar Vedantam:** Now, you became aware that some teams at these hospitals were making more errors, more mistakes than others. But besides tracking mistakes, you also were examining how teams functioned, and you found that some teams functioned better **Amy Edmondson:** than others. Tell me about the components of teamwork that you measured. Well, I used a team survey called the Team Diagnostic Survey, and it measured such things as the quality of interpersonal relationships in the team, the team's own self-assessment of how well they were performing, the team's assessment of whether and the degree to which they had the resources they need to do their job well, especially interested in their assessment of the leadership of the team and how good was that leadership. And these are a set of factors that had been previously recognized as important to team effectiveness. And **Shankar Vedantam:** you were also looking at how much people cared about their work and whether people felt like everyone was pulling their fair **Amy Edmondson:** share of the weight. Yes. And I think that assessment is partly captured in the quality of relationships measure, but there also was the measures of their satisfaction with the work, how happy they were in their job. And all of these measures tend to travel together. So in a good team, in a well-led team, they tend to be high on all of these factors. In a not good team, they're low on all of these factors. So you now have two sets of data, information on **Shankar Vedantam:** high-performing teams versus low-performing teams, and information on teams that make few mistakes or lots of mistakes. I mean, it seems quite obvious what the answer is going to be, but what was your intuition about how the quality of teams would relate to the mistakes that teams were making? Well, **Amy Edmondson:** my intuition was that better teamwork would lead to fewer mistakes or adverse events for patients. This just makes sense. And the more I understood about the nature of patient care in a hospital, the more I realized how interdependent it was. First of all, it's 24-7 operations. So there's shift handoffs. And second of all, most patients are seen by multiple different caregivers through the course of their stay. And so the quality of the coordination and the collaboration ought to really determine the degree to which high quality care is given. So of course I expected better teams would have fewer adverse events or mistakes. So the day comes when you're ready to analyze **Shankar Vedantam:** all of the data. You have a small computer disk with all the medication errors made by each team. Paint me a picture of what happened that day, Amy. **Amy Edmondson:** Well, I synced up the data on the disk with the data that I already had on the team properties in my computer and started to run the statistical analysis to connect those two data sources. And I just ran some simple correlations and I saw right away that the p-value, which indicates, you know, whether or not the finding is statistically significant, I saw that the p-value indicated that my data were statistically significant. So I was very excited. And then I looked more closely, leaning into the screen, and I realized that the sign was in the wrong direction. In other words, instead of seeing a relationship between good teamwork and low error rates, the statistical significance was saying there was a relationship between good teamwork and high error rates. How could that possibly be, Amy? Well, that was my question. And I sat there, I think I froze. I was upset and I was scared. And so I sat there looking at it and my first reaction was, I must have made a mistake. I must have put the data in incorrectly. So I walked very carefully through everything I'd done. I redid it. And nope, maybe my hypothesis had been a mistake, but I had not made a kind of data entry mistake. And so there I was staring at it again and again, puzzled. This just can't be true, right? can't be that better teams with higher quality relationships, more able and willing to collaborate effectively, to coordinate clearly, could have more, not fewer adverse drug events. And I suddenly had a thought, you know, maybe better teams don't make more mistakes. Maybe they're more able and willing to report them. And I suddenly remembered that I had inserted an extra question that wasn't in the original survey that is stated as follows. If you make a mistake in this unit, it's held against you and it's rated on a seven scale from, you know, not at all to a great deal. And it turned out that that single item was profoundly significantly correlated with the actual error rates. So that meant that when people agreed with this item, making a mistake would not be held against you, the error rates were higher. That's --- ### [Hospitals Where Mistakes Are Punished Versus Welcomed](https://share.snipd.com/snip/e61bd06d-0a69-4e09-83e1-71593dd30b99) 🎧 12:21 - 13:39 (01:17) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/1cd325c0-33a6-4f20-9596-9edad1784b66" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - A field observer described some hospital units as 'authoritarian' where staff said mistakes lead to being 'put on trial.' - Other nearby units said it's easy to talk about mistakes because patient safety is at stake and managers are receptive. #### 💬 Quote > If you make a mistake in this unit, you get treated like a two-year or you get put on trial. > — Amy Edmondson Research assistant's observations about unit climates #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** Well, **Amy Edmondson:** first of all, I think it's important to point out that I did not tell him what the survey data said, nor what the error data said. He only knew that there was a study of error going on. And I said, I just want your impression of what it's like to work in these units. I want you to observe them. I want you to interview them when they're on breaks and just, you know, learn as much as you can about these different work environments. And off he went. And after a week or so, he came back. He said, you know, they really are very different places to work. Some of them, he said, his words were just far more open. And others, he said, again, his words were authoritarian in nature. In some units, people would say things like, if you make a mistake in this unit, you get treated like a two-year or you get put on trial. So you really don't want to have made one. Or the manager, who is essentially the boss of the unit, if a nurse, would get angry and treat you badly. In other units, even though they're only maybe across the hall or up a floor or two, he found people saying things like, well, in this unit, it's really easy to talk about mistakes because of what's at stake. You patients' health is at stake. --- ### [Zero Error Demands Hide Problems](https://share.snipd.com/snip/0b23ac9e-9eef-4a6a-9bfa-bbabbad4dd9b) 🎧 17:58 - 18:31 (00:32) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/5366b580-f266-42b6-9896-77fbc6f3a619" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Insisting on zero errors often silences reporting rather than eliminating mistakes, so leaders lose visibility into real risks. - Edmondson argues learning requires honest reporting; otherwise failures persist unseen. #### 💬 Quote > When you insist that we must have... error-free performance... the main thing that happens is not that error goes away. It's that you stop hearing about it. > — Amy Edmondson On consequences of demanding no errors #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** that you were **Amy Edmondson:** mentioning **Shankar Vedantam:** to me earlier, when you send a signal that failure is not going to be tolerated, what happens then is not that the failure stop, but that the failure stop being reported. Exactly. **Amy Edmondson:** It's one of these profound insights that I think way too few leaders or even just people in families recognize that when you insist that we must have, you know, error-free performance or error-free lives, the main thing that happens is not that error goes away. --- ### [Match Failure Strategy To Context](https://share.snipd.com/snip/1d7ae35a-0679-429c-8559-93aac87a65b5) 🎧 18:44 - 19:21 (00:36) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/a5b0c18a-c048-4a00-afff-6f3228336953" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Use 'fail fast' in R&D and experimentation but preserve high reliability practices in operations with catastrophic risk. - Match your failure posture to context: exploratory labs versus operating theaters or airlines. #### 💬 Quote > The fail fast, fail often is a fantastic approach for a laboratory or for an R&D group. > — Amy Edmondson On when 'fail fast' makes sense #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** And this was to celebrate failure. Fail fast, fail early was the motto. Was this a better approach than leaders telling employees that failure was unacceptable? I **Amy Edmondson:** don't think it's possible to say one is better than the other. They are better for different contexts. So the fail fast, fail often is a fantastic approach for a laboratory or for an R&D group. The, you know, let's adhere to the highest possible standards and try our very best to get everything right is how we want to run an operating theater. --- ### [What Makes A Failure Intelligent](https://share.snipd.com/snip/2cadda69-a33f-4105-ba27-8c2102bade85) 🎧 19:59 - 20:50 (00:51) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/6a1ec664-6abf-4836-8dfa-2649f07dbd97" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Intelligent failures are small, hypothesis-driven experiments at the frontier of knowledge that produce useful information when they fail. - They differ from careless risks because they reduce scale and are designed to teach quickly. #### 💬 Quote > [Intelligent failures] are the undesired results of forays into new territory that are driven by a hypothesis and are as small as possible. > — Amy Edmondson Defining intelligent failures citing Sim Sitkin #### 📚 Transcript **Amy Edmondson:** are the undesired results of forays into new territory that are driven by a hypothesis and are as small as possible. And so in a sense, an intelligent failure is an experiment that didn't produce the result you had truly wanted it to produce. In **Shankar Vedantam:** some ways, what that implies then is that intelligent failures are almost always failures that take place on the frontiers of knowledge or discovery. **Amy Edmondson:** Yes. So there's two kinds of frontiers. One is the frontier of knowledge or discovery in that we're talking about a place where no one has been before. And the other is the frontier that's just new for you. Let's say you pick up a new hobby. You decide to take a ceramics class. That's new territory for you. --- ### [Columbia Foam Strike Was Dismissed As Routine](https://share.snipd.com/snip/839fbc30-b94d-4c6f-adb6-a87b1daf86f2) 🎧 21:31 - 22:56 (01:24) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/2e625dd0-8f21-4c4d-9759-f6bd4747c8f5" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - A large foam chunk struck Columbia's wing, creating a hole the size of a human head that led to catastrophic re-entry combustion. - Engineers saw a speck on launch video but senior managers dismissed foam strikes as routine maintenance. #### 💬 Quote > The very fact that he could see a speck at all suggested to him that the chunk... might be big enough to do real damage. > — Amy Edmondson On Rodney Rocha noticing a possible foam strike before Columbia disaster #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** In 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart upon re-entry into Earth's atmosphere, killing the seven astronauts aboard. You conducted an in-depth analysis of what happened to the Columbia when it broke apart, and it was something that you ended up calling a complex failure. Tell me the story of what happened, Amy. Well, **Amy Edmondson:** the shuttle had completely combusted on re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere on February 1st, 2003. And it was later determined that the reason for that is something called a foam strike. Now, what happens is to get the shuttle out beyond the Earth's atmosphere, it takes off with the help of a solid rocket booster. And that has that sort of has the energy to bring it out into space. And that is is surrounded by insulating foam. And occasionally little bits of that insulating foam would break off just because of the pressure of the launch. And sometimes those little bits strike the shuttle and make little dents, you just little nuisance problems that would lead to maintenance later on to fix them up. But in this case, there was a rather large piece of foam that dislodged and hit the shuttle on a delicate spot, the leading edge of the wing. And so it unfortunately made a larger hole, a hole the size of a human head. --- ### [Swiss Cheese Explains Complex Failures](https://share.snipd.com/snip/c4b2b7f0-55c3-4d1a-af17-22b7224505e4) 🎧 26:21 - 27:08 (00:46) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/398bbe09-ca0b-46c4-ac91-47899deff10c" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Complex failures arise when many small defects align like holes in Swiss cheese to create a tunnel to disaster. - Stopping any single contributing factor early often prevents the catastrophic alignment. #### 💬 Quote > When your cheese has air bubbles in it... they're not problematic until they line up and make a tunnel. > — Amy Edmondson Explaining James Reason's Swiss cheese model #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** I understand that in the healthcare arena, these kinds of complex failures are sometimes called the Swiss cheese model of failure. Explain that term for me, Amy, and explain how you use this analogy to analyze a case in which a young patient received a dangerous overdose of morphine. That's **Amy Edmondson:** right. And the Swiss cheese metaphor comes from an error theorist named James Reason from the UK. And he uses this metaphor of Swiss cheese to try to explain the of complex failures. He says, you know, when your cheese has air bubbles in it, those are in a sense defects in the cheese, but they're not problematic until they line up and make a tunnel. Just rarely happens, but when it happens, then the error goes all the way through. --- ### [Stop The Line When Something Seems Off](https://share.snipd.com/snip/a0d9e32e-ed1f-4fbf-9b9c-4abef11f1207) 🎧 30:12 - 31:13 (01:00) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/bed3af65-508b-4966-ab1e-0611597db407" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Empower frontline workers to halt a process when they spot anomalies, and rapidly diagnose rather than punish. - Toyota's Andon cord brings a leader to the line to fix or confirm issues; one in 12 pulls reveals real problems. #### 💬 Quote > When you pull the cord... a team leader comes quickly over and says, what do you see? > — Amy Edmondson Describing Toyota's Andon cord practice #### 📚 Transcript **Amy Edmondson:** Toyota is one of the best examples of doing this well. And probably the best practice that is maybe even the most famous of the Toyota production system is something called the Andon cord. And that is a literal cord that any team member is encouraged to pull whenever they see something wrong, or even more importantly, whenever they see something that might be wrong. Now, many people think once you pull the cord, the line instantly stops. It doesn't. When you pull the cord, what happens is that a team leader comes quickly over and says, what do you see? And you explain. And the two of you together diagnose what's happening. And most of the time, it turns out that you can either fix it or recognize that there wasn't a real problem and the line keeps going. But one out of 12 times, there is a real problem there. The line will stop, and it won't start again until that problem is fixed. --- ### [Expert Sailor Overboard From Momentary Inattention](https://share.snipd.com/snip/060456e1-33a9-4e96-b7eb-370a7e2a52d5) 🎧 32:34 - 34:28 (01:54) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/72f1908e-8201-4658-a765-5a621e88003f" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Amy Edmondson was knocked overboard during a regatta because she relaxed while dead downwind and the boom swung across, causing head injuries and nine stitches. - She labels this a basic failure: routine inattention while operating dangerous equipment. #### 💬 Quote > It was a small moment of inattention, looking away, not paying attention, just being overly casual... > — Amy Edmondson Her recount of getting knocked overboard and injured #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** Tell me what happened, Amy. Well, I had signed up for an alumni regatta **Amy Edmondson:** at Harvard. And when I got there, I realized kind of to my horror that everybody else there was about two years out of school, not several decades as I was, but that was okay. I can do it. I'm a good sailor. I'll do the best I can. So off I went and I was thrilled to not come in dead last in the first race. After the second race, there was a break where all the boats go back to the dock before the continues. The dock was dead downwind, which means that if you're in a sailboat, the boom on the sailboat holding up the sail is as far out as it can possibly go. And if you're dead downwind and the wind shifts even just a little bit, the boom is at risk of flying over to the other side. So any experienced sailor, and I am an experienced sailor, knows that. So we all know that when you're heading dead downwind, you had better be vigilant because you are at risk. Now in the Charles River where this regatta was, the wind is notoriously shifty. But the race was over. We're just heading into the shore. So I'm chatting with my crew, a little bit relaxed. And all of a sudden, the boom flies across the boat with a little wind shift, knocks me out. Next thing you know, I'm in a freezing cold Charles River. Oh you got knocked overboard. I got knocked overboard. It's early May. The water is probably 40 degrees. Fortunately, my crew, who's a fantastic sailor, quickly turns the boat around to come get me. I climb in the back, the stern of the boat, and then I just see it, all the blood everywhere in the hull that's coming out of my head. So it led to nine stitches in the side of my head. --- ### [Use Checklists Consciously Not By Habit](https://share.snipd.com/snip/c030f00d-c97c-4b41-8cf1-48cd7de6efeb) 🎧 35:09 - 36:12 (01:02) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/fa032f0b-c20a-4b90-9c73-3f1de07441de" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Use checklists mindfully and confirm critical items aloud rather than skip ahead by habit. - Air Florida crashed after the captain habitually skipped 'anti-ice' and the first officer moved on, showing checklist rituals can fail if rote. #### 💬 Quote > When the first officer said... anti-ice, the captain said habitually off. > — Amy Edmondson On Air Florida Flight 90 crash and checklist failure #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** We've actually talked about the power of checklists on an earlier episode of Hidden Brain. You've pointed out, Amy, that sort of just having a checklist is not enough. You actually have to do it mindfully. And you described the story of an airline crash that took place some years ago. Tell me the story of what happened. **Amy Edmondson:** So it was a freezing cold January morning in Washington, D.C., and Air Florida Flight 90 was headed for Fort Lauderdale, back home, I guess, and unfortunately they crashed into the Potomac River. Why did that happen? Well, it turns out, yes, they used the checklist. And most of our listeners are probably aware that the checklist includes the item anti-ice. When the first officer said, as part of the checklist, anti-ice, the captain said habitually off. It's Air Florida. I think most of their flights would not be using the anti-ice machinery. The first officer went on to the next item on the checklist. --- ### [Set Clear Goals And Do Homework Before Failing](https://share.snipd.com/snip/fc487552-57c2-4f33-b3fa-b9392ff513b6) 🎧 39:55 - 41:22 (01:26) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/38073dbc-6624-4ddf-9b1a-7c0f130ef6f8" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Intelligent failure requires a clear goal and prior homework so each failed experiment narrows the search for a solution efficiently. - Edison reframed failed attempts as discoveries, iterating thousands of times toward a working bulb. #### 💬 Quote > I haven't failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that don't work. > — Amy Edmondson (quoting Thomas Edison) On Edison's approach to repeated experiments #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** Amy, you found that intelligent failures happen in very specific circumstances. The first is that the failure happens in new and uncharted territory. I understand that you spoke to a prominent chemist, Jennifer Heemstra, and like many scientists, she does work on the frontiers of knowledge. I mean, she's trying to discover things that we don't know already. What did she tell you about what failure looks like in her lab? Well, she **Amy Edmondson:** has a wonderful way of leading her very thriving laboratory. She tells her students and young scientists, we're going to fail all day. And she says failure is a part of science. And of course, she's right. And what she means is if we are on the leading edge of our field, and that's where we hope to be, we're going to have some very smart, well-informed hypotheses, but many, if not most of them, in fact, in her view, 90% of them will end in failure. They will have been wrong. But each of those failures is in itself an important discovery. It lets them know what didn't work so that they can then quickly rethink and try the next one and hope that that might work. In **Shankar Vedantam:** some ways, it's like, you know, wandering around in a dark room with your arms outstretched and you're searching for the door. You know, and each sort of stab in the dark, you know, might not give you the door handle, but it tells you where the door handle is not. And eventually, if you make a sufficient number of failures, you're likely **Amy Edmondson:** to eventually find the door handle. --- ### [Optimism Bias Fuels Risky Debt Choices](https://share.snipd.com/snip/0ab2b816-81bb-4616-87fe-0970501806b8) 🎧 55:24 - 56:50 (01:25) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/a8f0f975-0526-44d2-ab5b-7f078888982d" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Optimism bias leads people to overestimate future income or outcomes and underprepare, pushing them into risky debt decisions. - John Dinsmore links this bias to taking on more debt expecting better future circumstances that may not materialize. #### 💬 Quote > When we think of the future, we always tend to think of it in terms of things working out for us. > — John Dinsmore On optimism bias and financial decisions #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** If the risks of failure are small, then it makes a lot of sense to try something new. If the risks are catastrophic, it's wise to be cautious. At Wright State University, John Dinsmore studies how we think about money and debt. Those things shape our ability to take on risk and to explore new ventures. We featured John's research on a recent episode of the show titled The Debt Trap. Many listeners have thoughts, comments, and personal stories about their adventures with money and debt. John is back today to respond to those stories. John Dinsmore, welcome back to Hidden Brain. Thanks for having me. John, one of the things that makes it difficult to accurately judge the risk of doing or not doing something is what scientists call the optimism bias. When it comes to money and debt, how does this bias work? Well, when we think of the **John Dinsmore:** future, we always tend to think of it in terms of things working out for us, us getting the promotion, us making more money in the future than we're making now. And while that is a good perspective to have in terms of perseverance and motivation, things don't always work out that way, right? We all have hiccups along the way. has a story of running into some bad luck. And when we make financial decisions involving projecting --- ### [Check For Drip Pricing Before You Commit](https://share.snipd.com/snip/dd8a2b12-249c-401d-819b-8867370622db) 🎧 59:02 - 01:00:11 (01:08) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/07d5093b-1489-4af4-ba90-da4a60a18947" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Beware drip pricing and layered fees that appear after initial commitment; compare final all-in costs before you buy. - Dinsmore warns of add-ons like seat selection or late fees that accumulate because buyers already committed to the purchase. #### 💬 Quote > Drip pricing is where you encounter a price for a good, and you think that one price represents all that the good is going to cost you. > — John Dinsmore Defining drip pricing and its effect on buyers #### 📚 Transcript **John Dinsmore:** Drip pricing is where you encounter a price for a good, and you think that one price represents all that the good is going to cost you. But as you go through the purchasing price, there are all these little add on costs. A popular example of drip pricing would be airline tickets, right? You get the airfare, you go through the work to figure out, here's the route and the time and the price. And then once you select that flight and start going through the purchasing price, well, then you get hit with, do you want to choose your seat? Do you want to have priority boarding? Do you all of these add on things? But since people have already committed to the initial purchase, they usually absorb these extra prices as they go. Typically, when you're looking at how certain forms of debt, say credit cards are advertised, you usually just see one interest rate up front, the interest rate being the price for the debt. But there are usually lots of kickers, whether it's late fees, or maybe the rate goes up over time. But, you know, we bite into that initial price that we encounter. --- ### [Timeshare Sale Turned $10,000 Loss](https://share.snipd.com/snip/7d64b2a1-635c-407e-87cd-f985edbd9cfd) 🎧 01:00:34 - 01:01:36 (01:01) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/f10e08a3-5b01-4b7c-bb3e-be334bde1046" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Listener Maria bought a timeshare with $10,000 on a credit card after a sales pitch promising three free weeks, but maintenance fees and restricted availability made it worthless. - The sales lure and complex contract trapped her in ongoing monthly costs she couldn't use. #### 💬 Quote > We're normally very smart about our finances, but we got caught up on being vacationed. > — Maria (listener quoted) Listener recounting being persuaded into a timeshare purchase #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** So Maria was on vacation, and on this vacation, she was convinced by marketers to purchase a timeshare. She says that she was enticed into the deal, which involved putting $10,000 down on a credit card after the salesman offered her three free weeks at any of the timeshare properties in their portfolio. **Amy Edmondson:** We're normally very smart about our finances, but we got caught up on being vacationed. And the lure of the three weeks, and then by the opportunity of staying in international locations, and well, it ended up being all lies, everything they said. They just made it impossible. And for all this time, you had to paying the monthly fee. In addition to the credit card that we purchased, the 10,000 was paid on a credit card. We also had to pay a monthly maintenance fee. We never even got to use it. --- ### [Irregular Costs Break Budgets](https://share.snipd.com/snip/c5704a5a-a9cf-4c1e-8ddf-57e2fea77d64) 🎧 01:15:35 - 01:16:40 (01:05) <iframe src="https://share.snipd.com/embed/obsidian-player/snip/050db277-8697-4877-ae5f-07bb5b859daf" width="100%" height="100" style="border: none; border-radius: 12px;" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-clipboard-write" ></iframe> - Expense prediction bias makes people good at forecasting regular bills but poor at irregular, unpredictable costs like major home repairs. - John Dinsmore notes homeowners often ignore sporadic but large expenses, leaving budgets vulnerable. #### 💬 Quote > We are pretty poor at predicting our irregular expenses. > — John Dinsmore On expense prediction bias and homeownership risks #### 📚 Transcript **Shankar Vedantam:** So **John Dinsmore:** expense prediction bias says that we actually are pretty good at being able to predict our regular expenses, right? So things like our mortgage or heating bill, they happen at the same time every month, and typically for about the same amounts. But we are pretty poor at predicting our irregular expenses. So things like car repairs, home repairs, entertainment expenses, things like that that happen sporadically and at different amounts. So when we think of a budget or we're trying to predict how much things are going to cost us over a given month, we're able to incorporate the regular expenses, but we completely ignore the irregular expenses. If you have ever owned a home, you know that there's always going to be frequent, but irregularly timed, maybe not every month, but one happens three months and then another seven months from then. These significant expenses that you know are going to happen at some point, but you don't know exactly when or for what amount. ---